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The ability to rapidly change from one course of action to another, 
i.e. "flexible behavior", is a hallmark of human cognition. Laboratory 
observations of switch costs, an increase in reaction time and errors 
when alternating between tasks compared to repeating a task, have been 
argued to be a measure of endogenous control during flexible behavior. 
However, alternative models suggest no such reconfiguration processes 
are necessary to account for performance in these task-switching 
situations. The first part of this dissertation uses neuroimaging to 
address whether reconfiguration processes do in fact occur in the explicit 
cuing variant of the task-switching paradigm. Using a 4:2 mapping 
between cues and tasks, we found neuroanatomical evidence for a 
IV 
dissociation between cue-switch (left prefrontal and lateral parietal) and 
task-switch (medial precuneus and cerebellar) related areas, consistent 
with the claim of endogenous control during task selection. The second 
portion explores whether automatic, long-term memory (LTM) processes 
can explain the "switch cost asymmetry", the fact that switch costs are 
larger when switching into a dominant task rather than into a competing 
non-dominant task. We modified an alternating runs task-switching 
paradigm to include either long or short response-to-stimulus intervals 
(RSIs) after each pair of trials (i.e., AA-AA-BB-BB), thereby inducing 
selection costs not only at the point of a task-switch (i.e., AA-BB), but 
also between same-task pairs (i.e., AA-AA). Using spatially compatible 
versus incompatible response rules and Stroop word versus color 
naming, we found asymmetric effects not only at task-change 
transitions, but also at task-repeat transitions when the RSI was long 
(presumably inducing frequent losses of task set). In two additional 
experiments, an asymmetry for long RSIs was obtained even when 
competing tasks were separated into alternating single task blocks, but 
not when the tasks were compared in a between-subject design. This 
pattern supports the idea that the asymmetry arises from interference 
effects occurring in LTM traces. The ·combined results of this 
dissertation characterize task-switching processes not as an "either-or" 
phenomenon in regards to the question of control, but rather as the 
v 
interplay between top-down, executive functions and bottom-up, long­
term memory priming mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER I 
EXAMINATION OF CONTROL IN TASK-SWITCHING 
How are our actions and behaviors initiated and guided? While 
this age-old question touches on deep-rooted philosophical questions 
(such as the nature of the will) it has only been in the last century or so 
that researchers have attempted empirical investigations of such issues 
of "control." As one might imagine, investigations of such a nebulous 
concept have proven difficult. First then, it is necessary to define what 
we even mean by the term control. This alone has proven no easy task, 
as even definitions of the concept are contentious.! On one hand, control 
is a seemingly simple concept to understand, even a dictionary definition 
gleams some insight into its usefulness as a psychological concept: "the 
power to influence or direct behavior or the course of events," (The New 
Oxford American Dictionary). While this definition is clearly aimed at the 
control of people, its essence - to direct behavior-is, in the simplest 
sense, the same conception by which we will use the term. 
Researchers often speak of "executive processes," the "central 
executive", "executive control", "executive function" or "executive 
attention" despite generally referring to the same concept. Use, 
hereafter, of any of these terms can, for our intents and purposes, can be 
considered synonymous. 
I 
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A return to this question of what constitutes control, with a more 
formal operationalization of control processing, will follow. But before 
doing so, it is imperative to also touch upon the issues of how and when 
control processes might come about in the first place. Consider the 
following example illustrating some basic principles of control: 
Before heading into the office for the day you remember you need 
to cash an important, expiring check. At the end of an exhausting 
day, you recall this "check cashing task" that needs completing 
and rush out of the office to make it to the bank before closing. 
You get into your car and make your way towards the bank, which 
also happens to be mostly along the same route as to your home. 
All is going smoothly and you have even reminded yourself during 
the drive that you need to stop at the bank your way home. Mid 
route however, you receive an important call on your cell phone 
and become engrossed in conversation. Distracted by the call, you 
find you have made an error in your route by turning right, 
towards your home, instead of making a left at the last 
intersection, which would have taken you onto the street your 
bank is located. You correct your error, but not for some time after 
discovering your blunder and by the time you make it to the bank 
you find to your consternation that it has closed. 
This anecdote, while possibly a bit farcical, illustrates a number of 
factors involved in controlled behavior, or in this case, "failure of control" 
(Monsell, 1996). First and foremost, controlled action is required in the 
face of automaticity. That is, control is required to overcome highly 
familiar and routinized behaviors, such as taking the familiar direction 
home (turning right) over the less familiar, less practiced turn towards 
the bank. Also, a critical decision ("response") was required in the face of 
a familiar stimulus in the example, i.e. the intersection. Note however 
that the critical stimulus in this case, the intersection, did not by itself 
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afford the appropriate behavior, rather it presented an equivocal 
choice-turn left or turn right. The stimulus then is said to have been 
"ambiguous" to the correct response in this case. Consider in contrast a 
"T" junction onto a one-way street where only one correct response would 
have been possible. Related to the concept of automatic behavior, the 
"turn right" response was also more strongly elicited by the intersection 
due to its familiarity. In other words it was a more "prepotent" response 
than the "turn left" option. Another critical point that can be drawn from 
this example is that the "correct" behavior in such situations is highly 
dependent on the current context. The context in this case is determined 
by the desired goal ("going to the bank"). However, keeping the desired 
goal state in mind is highly susceptible to interference, as demonstrated 
by the likely loss of this goal by the distracting phone call or overriding of 
this goal by a competing goal ("drive home") that may have been elicited 
by a particularly prepotent stimulus-response association (turn right at 
this intersection to go home; S-R association or S-R mapping). 
The above example also illustrates some of the basic conditions 
under which control is required for appropriate action. The set of 
components required to perform a desired action, in other words the 
configuration of goals, rules, responses, have been termed "mental sets" 
(Mayr, 2003) or "task-sets" (Monsell, 1996), sharing similar 
characteristics of earlier concepts such as "schemas" (Norman and 
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Shallice, 1986). Selecting then between mental-sets has been argued to 
require a reconfiguration of the cognitive system, in other words, an act 
of endogenous control (for a review, s,ee Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001; Monsell, 2003; Mayr, 2003). Putative cognitive processes that fall 
under the control rubric are numerous and include, but are not limited 
to: inhibition, switching, dividing or allocating attention, resolving 
conflicting between competing representations, planning, manipulation 
of items in working memory and task-switching. It is the last of these 
concepts, task-switching, that forms the focus of our investigation. 
While we just listed some exemplar processes that have been 
argued to constitute control functions, we still need a more formal 
working definition of the term. As aforementioned, the exact usage of the 
term is not agreed upon, but overarching notions of control include those 
processes involved in the organization, hierarchy and direction of action. 
Control functions then are those processes that occur particularly in 
situations that require novel or flexible behavior guided by internal goals, 
as compared to purely "bottom-up" driven behavior (e.g. Pennington and 
Ozonoff, 1996). As such, control processes are oft considered non­
automatic, slow (relative to automatic processes), effortful and require 
use of cognitive resources (e.g. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). While this 
descriptive overview of control admittedly may raise as many questions 
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as it answers, it, in the least, provides a general framework that can be 
referred to for definitions of control. 
The purpose of this dissertation though is not to define control, but 
rather examine the supposed control, and/or "control-less," processes 
that occur in contexts requiring the rapid selection between mental sets. 
This chapter (I) summarizes some basic principles of the so-called "task­
switching" paradigm, as well as outlines two broad classes of models that 
present differing accounts of these effects. These two explanations can 
be broadly grouped into control-based versus low-level, associative 
priming explanations. Evidence in favor of both accounts is further 
detailed in Chapter II, along with a review of neuroimaging studies that 
have attempted to separate components of switching. Chapter III 
provides our neuroimaging evidence in support of a two-component 
model of task-switching. Chapter IV presents behavioral data consistent 
with associative, long-term memory (LTM) explanations of the switch cost 
asymmetry effect. Integrating these results, the final chapter argues in 
favor of a LTM retrieval account of task-switching, composed of both top­
down (control) and bottom-up (automatic associative retrieval) influences 
on selection. 
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Basic Findings and Terminology of Task-Switching 
How might these so-called control processes be investigated 
empirically? The task-switching paradigm has gained popularity recently 
as an ostensible "window" into control processes. It has been known for 
some time that alternating between two simple choice reaction time (RT) 
tasks, incurs both a slowing of reaction times and an increase in the 
number of errors committed, an effect known as the switch cost. Jersild 
(1927) was the first to report this finding in a study that required 
participants to either alternate between addition or subtraction 
operations on a series of digits within a list, or simply repeatedly perform 
addition (or subtraction) on subsequent digits within a list. Lists that 
required alternating between operations ("tasks") took longer to complete 
as those lists that required repeating the same operation. 
Spector and Biederman (1976) extended the Jersild (1927) finding 
by showing these observed switch costs were much less pronounced 
when visual cues were present that indicated the appropriate operation 
on each set of digits (i.e. "+" or "_" symbols) than when these operators 
were not present. Stimuli in which only one possible response is 
possible, or afforded, such as when operation symbols were present in 
the Spector and Biederman (1976) study, are known as univalent or 
unambiguous stimuli. Conversely, the condition in which these symbols 
are not present, or any such situation in which the desired response is 
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not afforded by the external stimulus itself, are known as bivalent (or 
multivalent really as more than two choices might be possible) or 
ambiguous stimuli. Such ambiguous situations, which again lead to 
larger switch costs, arguably require an endogenous control process 
needed to identify the appropriate task. 
Further evidence in favor of endogenous control processes as a 
critical determinant of switch costs comes from the so-called preparation 
effect. If participants are informed, either by a cue or by a predictable 
task sequence, of the upcoming task and given a substantial amount of 
time (-600 or more milliseconds) between successive cues or stimuli, a 
substantial reduction of switch costs is observed (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). The existence of this preparation effect has been argued in favor 
of the idea that "reconfiguration" of the relevant task-set must occur 
whenever there is a change in task. Sufficient time between tasks then 
is thought to allow for these control processes to take place during this 
interval, thus reducing the time needed to do so after target presentation. 
It should be noted, however, that switch costs are not completely 
eliminated with preparation time, even with several second long 
intervals. This remaining cost is known as the residual switch cost. 
Switch costs have been replicated across a range of different tasks 
and stimuli type. Additionally, switch costs have been reliably observed 
in varied paradigms in addition to the somewhat informal II alternating 
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lists" method employed by Jersild (1927). For example, Rogers and 
Monsell (1995) devised a novel method for examining switch costs, 
known as the alternating runs methodology. In their paradigm, two tasks 
are performed within the same block of trials in runs of same-task trials 
that alternate in a predictable manner (e.g. AAAABBBB). One advantage 
of this method is the ability to measure discrete RTs on a trial-by-trial 
basis, as opposed to the global assessment of RT of the list method. 
Additionally, task-switches and repetitions can be assessed within the 
same block. This led to the finding that RTs on no-switch (repeat) trials 
within single-task blocks (such as in a repetition list) are actually faster 
than when no-switch trials are performed in the same block as another 
task (such as in an alternating runs design); this is known as the mixing 
or global selection cost. Another popular method of assessing switch 
costs is by the task-cuing (also known as random cuing) paradigm that 
presents task in an unpredictable sequence, with tasks indicated by the 
current cue (generally a letter or word cue) presented either before or 
concomitant with the stimulus (target). This methodology allows for tight 
control over parameters. For example, the preparation time can be 
varied via the cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI). Whereas the interval 
between tasks can be manipulated via the response-to-cue (RCI) interval, 
allowing for "passive decay" of the preceding task-set (e.g. Meiran, 1996; 
Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). 
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But is switching between tasks really special? That is, is the 
selection process(es) required between tasks really any different than the 
within-task selection that must occur (e.g. selecting the appropriate S-R 
mapping) in any choice RT task? In fact, within-task difficulty does not 
generally interact with switch costs, supporting the idea that selection 
between tasks is independent from selection within tasks (e.g. 
Mecklinger, von Cramon, Springer, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1999; Rogers 
and Monsell, 1995; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Gopher, Armory, & Greenshpan, 
2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Neuroanatomical evidence also supports 
this distinction. Patients with left-frontal cortical damage exhibit 
profound deficits in switching tasks, but not in other difficult, control 
functions such as inhibition (Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry, & Keele, 2006). 
Additionally, neuroimaging studies have show switch selective areas, 
independent of task-selective areas (Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & Cohen, 
2006). 
Before moving on to accounts of switching, some additional effects 
from the task-switching literature warrant introduction here, as they will 
become highly relevant in later discussions. First of these is the 
congruency effect. Recall that in the case of ambiguous stimuli, 
dimensions relevant to both tasks are visible concurrently. Thus, the 
correct response for the current task can potentially be mapped to the 
same response as the other, non-relevant task, (i.e. "congruent" trials) or 
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to a different response then is afforded by this stimulus in the context 
of the former task (i.e. "incongruent" trials). For example, say 
participants switch between color and shape discrimination tasks, 
responding with a "left" keypress to red or square objects and a "right" 
keypress to green or circle objects. Thus, in this example, a green circle 
would be a congruent trial, since a "right" response is required for either 
task, whereas a green square would be incongruent, since a "right" 
response would be required if the color task is current, but a "left" 
response when the shape task is current. Incongruent trials typically 
show longer RTs than congruent trials on switch trials; congruency 
effects however cannot account for the entirety of switching effects as 
congruent and neutral stimuli also show significant switch costs (Rogers 
and Monsell, 1995). Interference from preceding task sets has also been 
used to explain the so-called switch cost asymmetery effect. This is the 
finding that switching into a highly dominant or "strong" task, such as 
Stroop word naming shows larger switch costs than switching to a less 
dominant, "weaker" task, such as Stroop color naming (e.g. Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). Further examination and an alternate 
explanation of this effect will follow in subsequent sections (Chapter IV 
contains an in-depth assessment of the switch cost asymmetry effect). 
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"Control-Like" Accounts 
How can we account for these various effects related to task­
switching? Can current models accurately explain all aspects of these 
phenomena? We have already touched on the idea that switching 
requires the "resetting" of the cognitive system to update the current 
task-set. But what exactly might this consist of? Possibilities include: 
shifting the attentional focus from one perceptual dimension of a feature 
to another (e.g. Meiran, 2000), activating the current task-set and/ or 
inhibiting the currently irrelevant task-set (e.g. Mayr & Keele, 2000; 
Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000) and retrieval and updating of the current· 
task .goals and rules from LTM (e.g. Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; 2003; 
Rubinstein et al., 2001). Such processes could all fall under the rubric 
of "control" processing, given their likely conscious, effortful and non­
automatically elicited nature. 
The preparation effect has been argued as critical is the 
postulation that switching requires reconfiguration and control 
processes, as aforementioned. However, might we better elucidate these 
potential mechanisms involved in preparation? One intuitive possibility 
for such a beneficial operation that might occur during preparatory 
intervals is verbal self-instruction. For instance, participants might 
verbalize the upcoming task or even rehearse the relevant rule mappings. 
Goschke (2000) presented initial findings consistent with this idea. In 
12 
this study, participants were required in one condition to verbalize the 
upcoming task with a relevant word label (e.g. "shape" if shape 
discrimination was the forthcoming task) during the preparation (CSI) 
interval, whereas in the other condition an irrelevant task word (e.g. a 
particular day of the week) was verbalized. As expected, reduced switch 
costs, as a function of CSI, were seen for the task-relevant label 
condition, but not when an unrelated verbal response was produced, 
suggestive of a critical function of language during preparation. 
Other investigators have used articulatory suppression (AS) tasks, 
requiring the continued repetition of a familiar word or sequence (e.g. 
"the")' concurrent with task performance to examine the potential role of 
verbalization in switching. Articulatory suppression is thought to 
selectively impair phonological loop processing, while leaving executive 
control processes proper relatively unaffected (Baddeley, Lewis & Vallar, 
1984). Highly reliable, negative effects of AS on switch costs have been 
found across a number of paradigms and stimuli types. Moreover, these 
effects were apparent only when ambiguous stimuli (operator signs 
absent) were used and larger with less direct compared to more direct 
(i.e. letters instead of word cues) task cues (e.g. Baddeley, Chincotta, & 
Adlam, 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Saeki & Saito, 2004). Given 
these results, particularly the preparation and ambiguity effects, it was 
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argued that verbal self-cuing might guide endogenous control during 
task switching (e.g. Miyake & Emerson, 2003).2 
The LTM Retrieval Account 
Consistent with this purported function of verbalization in cuing 
the upcoming task, is the proposal that switching is in essence a 
problem of selecting the correct task-set from long-term memory (Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001). Mayr and Kliegl (2000) in fact 
hypothesized that much of what can be done to "reconfigure" the system 
is to retrieve or reload the relevant task-set into working memory from 
long-term memory in a controlled, endogenous manner. To test this 
idea, they implemented an alternating runs design and varied the degree 
of within-task retrieval difficulty by using either a semantic or episodic 
retrieval task. As expected, a retrieval-demand effect was seen, such 
that switching to the episodic task (high retrieval) incurred larger switch 
costs than switching to the semantic task (low retrieval). The authors 
interpreted this increase in switch costs as a result of the increased 
interference present between the high retrieval demands of the primary 
task (episodic retrieval) and the putative retrieval of task-set information 
when a switch in task is required. Moreover, in a second experiment, the 
2 Although see Bryck and Mayr (2005) for evidence suggestive of a general 
(i.e. non-specific to switch trials) role of verbalization, particularly when 
sequencing demands of task order are high. 
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authors found a difficulty manipulation of the primary tasks, not 
thought to affect retrieval demands (reversed word order), did not 
similarly increase switch costs. This suggests the results of the first 
experiment cannot be explained simply by some general difficulty 
difference between the tasks. 
Mayr and Kliegl (2000) hypothesized that what needs to be 
retrieved specifically are the explicit rules for the upcoming task. To test 
this, they presented subjects with the a cue prior to stimulus 
presentation which consisted of the relevant rule for the upcoming task, 
that is the response assignments required on the upcoming trial (e.g. 
"bottom-top"). As expected, this manipulation successfully reduced 
switch costs, as well as eliminated the retrieval-demand effect, compared 
to a control condition with no cue. Additionally, increasing the 
preparation time (CSI) reduced the retrieval demand effect; however 
simply increasing the passive decay time between trials (RCI, which does 
not allow for preparation, e.g. Merian, 1996) did not reduce the retrieval 
demand effect. 
Consistent with this finding, Rubinstein et al. (2001) showed that 
switch costs increased with tasks requiring a more complex rule than 
those requiring a simpler rule. The authors interpreted this result in 
terms of retrieval difficulty, arguing that complex rules are harder to 
retrieve than simpler rules. In summary, Mayr and Kliegl (2000) suggest 
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that task-set reconfiguration processes require the retrieval of the 
relevant rules from LTM and loading these into working memory (WM) 
before an act of selection can occur. Based on these observations, Mayr 
and other (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; 2003; Mayr, 2003) have proposed a LTM 
retrieval model of task-switching. The basic tenets of this idea suggest 
that working memory, at least in demanding task-switching situations, is 
able to hold only one task-set representation, including the relevant rules 
(e.g. S-R mappings), on-line at any given time. In other words, activating 
a representation in working memory is akin to selecting this task (Mayr 
& Kliegl, 2000; Mayr, 2003). This single-task constraint is likely not due 
to capacity limitations (Rubinstein et al., 2001), but might be an effective 
means of reducing between task competition that arises when two, or 
more, task-sets are relevant for performance (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 
Rubinstein et al., 2001). This constraint has the side-effect then, at least 
for rapid back-and-forth switching situations, that performance of a new 
task requires the purging of the old task-set and the activation of the 
now relevant task-set. Thus re-retrieval of the now relevant features of 
the new task, likely the rules required of this task (e.g. "green color = 
right response"), from LTM is required. A more in-depth account of this 
model will be considered in later chapters, but for now it is important to 
note this model has the ability to parsimoniously account for the host of 
task-switching effects thus far discussed. 
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location-relevant task (S-R compatibility task) with incompatible 
mappings (Proctor & Lu, 1999; Tagliabue, Zorzi, Umilta, & Bassignani, 
2000). This reversal can persist for quite some time (up to 600 trials 
later). These results suggest that associations built in an earlier context 
can have a lasting (i.e. LTM based) influence on the current context if 
features (S-R associations in this case) overlap, or partially overlap. 
Presumably, these features are automatically retrieved due to this 
overlap with previous stimuli/tasks. As such, these effects are difficult 
to explain via purely control mechanisms of switching (Allport &; Wylie, 
2000). 
Such results form the basis of a class of accounts of task-switching 
that can be referred to as associative retrieval models. Examination of 
such "bottom-up" processing in task-switching, and control in general, is 
oft overlooked. Perhaps this is due to the influence of hierarchical and 
stage-like models of information processing, which tend not to consider 
the role "lower" levels of behavior can have on "higher" levels (e.g. 
Sternberg, 1969, Norman and Shallice, 1986, Koechlin, Ody, & 
Kounelher, 2003; Rubinstein et al., 2001). However, evidence emerging 
in the past few years has suggested a considerable role of LTM processes 
during task-switching. Extending these findings, Waszak, Hommel and 
Allport (2003) showed that this long-term priming of stimulus/task 
features can be quite specific. They used a picture-word Stroop task 
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with stimuli consisting of a picture of a highly namable object and a 
word embedded within this picture (typically incongruent with the 
picture). Participants first responded based on the picture feature of the 
stimuli, then in a later block, they responded by naming the word. 
Critically, the experimenters also manipulated the stimuli previously 
presented to participants during the word-reading task by either 
repeating stimuli seen previously (while performing the picture-naming 
task) or by presenting novel stimuli not previously in the experiment. 
The critical result from this study was that previously seen stimuli 
incurred significantly larger switch costs than unprimed stimuli. Waszak 
et al. (2003) interpreted this result as reflecting "binding" or integration 
between task sets and low-level features. It seems even non-relevant 
features (the non-attended to features of a stimulus) could become 
integrated with task context. Additionally, these priming effects were 
seen even after long intervals (up to 100 trials) between the first 
presentation of a prime and its probe trial. This suggests the 
representation of these bound representations must have resided in LTM. 
Not only did these associations persist over time, but item specific 
interference increased with the number of presentations during the probe 
(picture-naming) phase. Thus, these associations between task arid 
stimuli seem to be strengthened in LTM with repeated exposure, and as 
such, produced greater interference during switching. 
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A similar interpretation was given by the results of a study by 
Mayr and Bryck (2005). The introduced a design which allowed for 
disambiguating rule (task) changes and S-R associations (because 
certain S-R associations could occur under two different rules). The 
critical finding here was that complete S-R associations produced 
benefits only when the rule also repeated, but incurred costs when the 
rule changed. This result provides another example suggestive of task 
sets becoming integrated with lower levels features. 
This interpretation of. stimulus features forming integrated 
representations is similar to other conceptualizations, outside of the 
task-switching literature, of bounded representations. For example, 
Logan's "instance theory" of memory (e.g. Logan, 2002) suggests that 
during task performance, a residual "instance" of a particular episode is 
encoding and stored in a memory trace that contains features of that 
particular event, such as the particular S-R mapping executed, stimulus 
features, etcetera. This concept of integrated representations is also in 
line with notions of "object files" from the visual perception and attention 
literature (e.g. Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbes, 1992) and "event files" 
from the perception and action literature (e.g. Hommel, 2004). These 
traces then can include many features of the encoded episode and the 
general context in which it occurred, such as the intended goal, 
stimulus, rule and response executed (e.g. Logan, 1988; Hommel, 2004; 
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Mayr & Bryck, 2005). One critical, additional, property of these "event 
files" is that only attended features are included in a memory trace, or 
"instance" (Logan, 2002). However, Neill (1997) extends this idea a bit by 
assuming that actively ignored distractors (in a negative priming task) 
can also be included in traces as "to-be-ignored" items. 
To summarize, these studies are consistent with the idea that 
codes representing task-relevant features can reside in LTM and can 
have a profound effect on presumed "control" function of switching. It 
should be noted that the preceding accounts should really be qualified as 
those that deemphasize control processing during task-switching, but do 
not necessarily claim no such processing exists in a task-switching 
environment. However, they do point out limitations with current models 
that suggest the entirety of switch costs can be explained solely by the 
time taken to complete control functions. 
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Behavioral Studies of Cue-Switching Versus Task Switching 
One standard version of the task-switching paradigm, the 
aforementioned task-cuing design, entails presenting participants with a 
cue indicating which task is to be performed on a trial in advance of the 
actual stimulus presentation. (e.g. Merian, 1996). This methodology has 
the advantage of allowing for the exact manipulation of many of the 
timing variables present during switching. Perhaps foremost of these, is 
the cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI), which allows for an assessment of the 
role of preparation during target stimulus has been shown to reduce, 
although not eliminate, switch costs (e.g. Rogers and Monsell, 1995). 
Presumably, longer CSls allow participants to prepare for an upcoming 
switch in tasks once the cue has been presented. Given the cue 
information, participants should be able to extrapolate the upcoming 
task-set parameters, which might include the relevant task rules (e.g. set 
of S-R mappings). What or how exactly participants prepare for an 
upcoming task is open to debate, but it is generally agreed upon that this 
preparation is an intentional act of reconfiguration, likely reflecting a 
endogenous control process(es). 
However, two groups of researchers documented a potential 
problem with the standard procedure of the explicit task-cuing design. 
Both Mayr and Kliegl (2003) and Logan and Bundeson (2003) pointed out 
that a change in task also requires a change in the cue. As such, the 
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cuing design cannot differentiate potential effects of changing cues 
from changing tasks (task-sets) with standard measures of switch cost 
(task-switch minus repeat trials). It is possible then that the typical 
switch costs observed in cuing studies result from processes required to 
re-encode the cue on a switch trial, or conversely, benefits from repeating 
the same cue on a no-switch trial, rather than switching task-sets. It is 
therefore of great theoretical importance to determine whether switch 
costs arise simply due to a change in cues, a change in tasks, or both. 
For example, according to the previously discussed LTM-view of 
switching (e.g. Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003), either a change in cue or 
change in task constitutes a change in the retrieval pathway into the 
correct set of rules-proposed as a critical determinant to switch costs. 
Thus, it is critical to determine whether there are separable components 
associated with a change in a cue compared to a change in task. 
Both groups (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 2003) tested 
this idea by introducing a new variant of the task-cuing paradigm with a 
4 to 2 mapping between cues and tasks (i.e. two separate cues linked to 
each of the tasks). This design allows for the assessment then of 
changes in the cue that are independent of changes in tasks (i.e. a trial 
in which the same task was cued as the previous one, but via the other 
cue), a condition labeled "cue-switch" by Mayr and Kliegl (2003). To test 
whether "true" task-switching effects exist, i.e. a cost associated only 
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with a change in a task, the authors compared task-switch trials
(change in cue and task) with cue-switch trials, which they called "task-
switch" costs3 • Again, this novel design allowed for delineating the effects
of a change in cue from a change in task and was directly tested by
comparing cue-switch costs (cue-switch versus no-switch trials) from
"true" task-switch costs (task-switch versus cue-switch trials).
Using two arbitrary (i.e. not semantically related to the tasks)
single letter cues per task, a color and a shape task, Mayr and Kliegl
(2003) found a strong cue-switch effect (~ 250 ms) and a somewhat
smaller, but robust, task-switch effects (~ 150 ms) in several
experiments. Further, they showed evidence that these two effects were
separate from one another and likely reflect two independent
components of task-switching. For one, the cue-switch effect, but not
the task-switch cost, seemed to be sensitive to preparation as the cue-
switch cost decreased with increasing CSI. Additionally, only the cue-
switch effect was sensitive to practice effects, as cue-switch trial RTs
decreased over blocks compared to no-switch trials. On the other hand,
negative response repetition effects, longer RTs to trials in which a
3 Logan and Bundesen (2003) used different terminology. They labeled
trials in which neither the cue nor the task changed as "cue repetition",
trials in which only the cue changed as "task repetitions" and trials in
which the task and cue changed as "task-switch" trials. To simplify and
avoid confusion, we will use the terms no-switch, cue-switch and "true"
task-switch to refer to these respective conditions.
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response was repeated compared to changed, occurred in task-switch,
but not in cue-changes conditions.
Mayr and Kliegl (2003) also examined the locus of the "backwards
inhibition" effect, the fact that a task that was recently performed
induces a cost compared to a more novel task on the current trial and is
generally regarded as reflective of inhibitory processing induced by the
recently relevant task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). With the standard explicit
cuing paradigm, researchers are not able to sort out whether the
inhibitory processing results at the level of cue encoding, or the actual
task-set representation; the modified 4:2 cue-to-task mapping paradigm
should be able to shed light onto this question. To test this, in
Experiment 3 of Mayr and Kliegl (2003), a third task was introduced
(size), again cued by two separate letters. This allowed the authors to
examine potential differences in backwards inhibition costs on trials in
which the task was the same on the current trial as the task on n-2
trials, but differed in whether the cue repeated or changed on the critical
trial compared to the n-2 trial. Inhibition at the level of cue processing
would predict an increase in RT only in the case where the same cue
repeated on the current trial as the n-2 trial. However, the results were
consistent with inhibitory effects at the task-set level representation, as
RT costs for trials in which the task repeated on the current trial as the
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n-2 trial were only apparent when a change in cues occurred.4 This
finding suggests that backwards inhibition affects the task-switch
component, but not the cue-switch component of switching.
To summarize the results of Mayr and Kliegl (2003), they
successfully delineated cue-switch from task-switch effects using the 4:2
cues-to-task explicit cuing paradigm. Further, they argued these two
components are independent of one another, as cue-switching was
affected by preparation and practice effects, while task-switching was
affected by response repetition and backwards inhibition effects, but not
vice-versa. They characterize these two components as having very
different functions. The cue-switch, given its sensitivity to CSI, likely
reflects intentional, preparatory processes that act to reconfigure the
cognitive system for a task-set switch, whereas the task-switch stage
likely involves the relatively automatic "application" of rules or S-R
mapping once the target stimulus is present. They frame this in terms of
the "LTM retrieval" view of switching, which argues a large portion of
switch costs are attributable to the need to retrieve the relevant rules
from LTM in order to establish the current task-set, which is largely what
4 Interestingly, backwards inhibition effects were not seen in n-2 task
repeat trials in which the cue also repeated. This is inconsistent with the
earlier work of Mayr and Keele (2000). See Mayr and Kliegl (2003) for a
possible explanation of why they failed to see this effect in their
Experiment 3. Regarding our discussion, the critical finding is that
backwards inhibition appears to occur at the task-switch "application"
stage, and not at the cue-switch stage.
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one can do to prepare for an upcoming task-switch, as argued by Mayr 
and Kliegl (2000). The LTM view of switching is further discussed in 
Chapter V. The practice effects on cue-switching, the authors argue, in 
consistent with an intentional, retrieval process as the cue-task 
associations were arbitrary to begin with, but over practice these 
associations were likely strengthened. According to the retrieval view of 
switching, this is akin to strengthening the retrieval pathway between a 
given cue and its corresponding task, which should make it easier to 
bring relevant information into working memory. However, there is no 
reason to believe practice should affect the theorized relatively automatic 
application of rules once already loaded into working memory during the 
task-switching phase. The fact that negative response repetition effects 
and backwards inhibition effects were seen on task-switch trials, but not 
cue-switch trials, was also consistent with the view these comprise two, 
independent stages during switching. 
As aforementioned, Logan and Bundesen (2003) used a very 
similar methodology to differentiate cue-switch from task-switch effects. 
The used digits as stimuli and tasks alternated between determining the 
magnitude (lower or higher than '5') or the parity (odd or even) of the 
stimulus. Two cues per task were used which were words semantically 
related to the task, (e.g. "magnitude" and "high-low" for judging the 
magnitude of the digit). Robust cue-switch effects were seen (ranging 
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from 95 to 168 ms) as in Mayr and Kliegl (2003), however, much 
smaller task-switch effects were observed (between 14 to 35 ms) in the 
Logan and Bundesen (2003) study. Logan and colleagues replicated this 
general finding of robust cue-switching, but virtually absent task­
switching costs in several follow-up studies (Logan & Bundesen, 2004; 
Arrington & Logan, 2004; Schneider & Logan, 2005, 2006). These 
authors claim then that no "true" task switch effects occur during 
switching, but can be explained solely by changes in cues- repetition of 
the same cue produces priming benefits (i.e. no-switch trials), while 
changing the cue incurs a cost, whether it is a cue-switch or task-switch 
trial seems not to matter. This priming account thus requires no need to 
assume reconfiguration, or endogenous control, processes by the system 
when switching tasks (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). 
Schneider and Logan (2005) provide an explicit model of their 
priming account of switching in the task-cuing paradigm. Their model 
explains performance based on two major mechanisms: priming of cue 
encoding and retrieval from LTM of a compound cue. Cue encoding 
processing is the time needed to process the current task cue into a 
useful representation in working memory (short-term memory in their 
terminology). The activation level of cues in working memory is thought 
to decay'in the time intervening between trials. Once a cue has been 
encoded, retrieval of the appropriate response category from LTM can 
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then be completed. This retrieval process, the authors argue, is 
mediated by a compound retrieval cue, formed by the task cue and target 
stimulus on each trial. Selecting the correct response depends then on 
the combined strength of the association between the cue and the 
response category and the association between the target and the 
response category. Differences in cue encoding time based on the 
transition type is the major determinant of the cue-switch and task­
switch effects observed in their version of the 4:2 cue-to-task cuing 
paradigm. 
The Schneider and Logan (2005) model accounts for cue-switch 
and task-switch results based on semantic/ associative priming 
mechanism as follows. First off, it is assumed that cues indicating the 
same task have a fairly high level of association with one another (e.g. 
"odd" and "even"), but across task pairs are only weakly associated with 
one another (e.g. "odd" and "low"), assumptions that are supported by 
free association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1999, as cited in 
Schneider & Logan, 2005). Logan and Scheinder (2006) also provide 
empirical evidence that associated cues can prime each other, 
independent of the association of the cue to the stimuli and task. The 
authors found that pairs of highly semantically related cues (e.g. "queen" 
and "king") produced faster RTs than conditions in which the pair of cues 
had a low association to one another (e.g. "queen" and "salt") on cue­
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switch trials. Note the cues used here were not semantically related to 
the magnitude and parity tasks used (Logan & Schneider, 2006a). 
Differences between transition types arise then due to priming effects 
between cues during the cue-encoding phase via the Schneider and 
Logan model. In the case of a no-switch (i.e. cue-repeat) trial, RT will be 
fast based on fast cue encoding processing due to the high residual 
activation of the same cue (i.e. repetition priming) on each trial. In a 
cue-switch trial, cue-encoding processes will be intermediately fast due 
to associative priming between similar cue (e.g. "odd" and "even"), but not 
as fast as in the cue repetition condition, which can thereby explain the 
cue-switch effect (cue-switch trials slower than no-switch trials). The 
"true" task-switch effect can be explained then by the intermediate 
strength associative priming mechanisms occurring for a cue-switch (e.g. 
"odd" to "even") compared with no priming on a task-switch trial (e.g. 
"odd" to "high"). 
How then does this model explain the large true task-switch effects 
seen with arbitrary cues (e.g. Mayr & Kliegl, 2003)? Logan and 
Bundesen (2004) tackled this question by manipulating the semantic 
relatedness of the cues used and found true task-switch effects with 
arbitrary cues (i.e. letters), but small to no task-switch effects with 
meaningful cues. Logan and Bundesen (2004) added the argument into 
their priming model that using arbitrary cues requires associating these 
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cues with a "mediator" (e.g. a task name like "color"), whose 
representation must first be retrieved before retrieving the relevant 
response category from LTM. Thus, according to this interpretation, true 
task-switch effects are due to the repetition of the same mediator in the 
case of a cue-switch trial, whereas in a task-switch trial, a different 
mediator is retrieved. See Logan and Schneider (2006b) for evidence in 
favor of this idea. The critical aspect of this model then is the fact that a 
series of component processes-encoding the cue, encoding the target, 
retrieving the response category, selecting the response -occurs on every 
trial, independent of the transition type. This single-task set assumption 
does not require reconfiguring the system to a new set of processes after 
a change in tasks occurs. In other words, this model of switching is 
"control-less", in that it does not necessitate the incorporation of any 
executive functions to explain switch cost phenomena. 
The use of arbitrary versus meaningful cues proved to be a critical 
experimental difference that can account for the difference between 
substantial true task-switch effects seen in Mayr and Kliegl (2003) and 
the small to absent true task-switch effects in Logan and Bundesen 
(2003). Schneider and Logan (2006) and Monsell and Mizon (2006) both 
illuminate another notable experimental difference between these two 
studies is the probability of a task-switch occurrence. Consider for a 
moment the number of unique cue-task pairs configurations possible in 
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each of the three transition types with four cues to two tasks. If all 
possible configurations are used, there are four possible no-switch and 
cue-switch pairs, but eight possible task-switch pairs. For example, let 
us label the cues for one task as "1" and 2" and the cues for the other 
task as "3" and "4." We can see then that the unique configurations for 
no-switch transitions are limited to 1-1,2-2,3-3, and 4-4. Similarly, 
cue-switch transitions have only four unique configurations: 1-2,2-1,3­
4 and 4-3. However, tasks-switch possibilities double to eight: 1-3, 1-4, 
3-1,4-1,2-3,3-2,2-4 and 4-2. While Mayr and Kliegl (2003) chose to 
balance the proportion of switch types (.33 for each) in their experiment 
by only using half of the possible task-switch transition types (i.e. only 
one cue-cue type, not it's reversal), Logan and Bundesen (2003) used all 
eight possibilities, thereby creating an over-proportionate amount of 
task-switches overall (occurring 50% of the time, while no-switch and 
cue-switches each could occur 25% of the time). Both Monsell and 
Mizon (2006) and Schneider and Logan (2006) manipulated the 
probability of switching in a series of studies and found that low­
probability of switching conditions led to robust true task-switch effects, 
while higher probabilities of switching lead to little or no true task-switch 
effects, replicating Mayr and Kliegl (2003) and Logan and Bundeson 
(2003), respectively. 
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This finding did little to clarify the question of reconfiguration 
versus priming, as the results were again interpreted very differently. 
Monsell and Mizon (2006) claim that strategic differences in the way 
participants perform during low and high probability switching situations 
could account for these observed differences in true task-switch effects. 
The authors argue that under high switch likelihood situations, 
participants may simply adopt a strategy of assuming a switch in task 
will occur on the next trial and therefore prepare, i.e. reconfigure, for the 
opposite task on each trial. If participants employed this strategy on all, 
or even a majority of, trials, it would have the effect of reducing RTs 
when an actual change in task did occur (i.e. task switch trials), since 
presumably the reconfiguration process could begin, or even finish, 
before the stimulus appeared. This strategy would of course have 
negative consequences on trials in which the task did not change (i.e. no­
switch and cue-switch) trials. The combined effects of lower task-switch 
trials and increased cue-switch trials due to this strategy could explain 
the lack of true task-switch costs, but large cue-switch effects when 
switching probability was kept high. 
However, Schneider and Logan (2006) interpreted their results in 
the context of their cue-encoding priming model and claim that the 
relative frequencies of cues led to differences in the amount of priming 
seen. In other words, if certain cue-cue transitions are more frequent 
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than others, these instances will have a greater change of being 
recalled from memory on a given trial if the current cue is similar to past 
events, a la Logan's instance theory (Logan, 1988). So, in Schneider and 
Logan's (2006) high switching probability (p = .7) condition, task-switch 
cue transitions, (e.g. odd-even to high-low) are more frequent than no­
switch (e.g. odd-even to odd-even) or cue-switch (e.g. odd-even to 
magnitude) transitions and this greater occurrence during performance 
in the experiment would lead to morel stronger instances of these 
particular cue-cue configurations. The odd-even cue in this case will 
become more associated with task-switch transitions and this stronger 
association will lead to more activation of the relevant task-switch cues 
(high-low and magnitude) on the next trial. This higher activation will 
then lead to priming of cue-encoding if the next trial is in fact a task­
switch, leading to faster task-switch trial RT and subsequently lower true 
task-switch effects (Schneider and Logan, 2006). Schneider and Logan 
(2006) do not rule out the possibility that strategic changes could be 
occurring in participants when transition probabilities are manipulated. 
In this scenario, priming would still result from advance activation of the 
next cue; however, instead of the automatic retrieval of instances, this 
activation of cues would result from participants expectancy of what the 
next transition type would be, based presumably on the probability of 
transitions experienced during the experiment. 
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The plausibility of both of these interpretations, combined with 
the confound of switching probability and frequency of cue-cue 
transitions in both studies, leaves open the question of what accounts for 
probability effects on true task-switch and cue-switch costs. Mayr (2006) 
introduced a strategy-based interpretation of these effects similar to the 
Monsell and Mizon (2006) model, termed the task-level adaptation 
account, with an added wrinkle. Mayr (2006) argues that participants 
may in fact employ different strategies based on probability differences 
during task performance, but this strategy may not be an adaptation to 
switching per se, rather an adaptation to the likelihood of a task-switch 
given a change in cues. The methodological differences between Mayr 
and Kliegl (2003) and Logan and Bundesen (2003) not only result in an 
overall switching probability difference, but also result in a difference in 
this conditional probability of a task change occurring given a cue 
change (p = .5 in Mayr and Kliegl, 2003 and p = .67 in Logan and 
Bundesen, 2003). If participants are able to make a fast judgment 
regarding cue information on a given trial, if confronted with a change in 
cue, participants are likely to engage in reconfiguration processes and 
prepare for a change in task if a high conditional probability exists that a 
change in cue will produce a change in tasks. 
Mayr (2006) independently manipulated specific cue-cue transition 
frequencies and conditional cue-task switch probabilities to directly test 
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the task-level adaptation account from the cue priming account in a 
4:2 cues-to-task explicit cuing paradigm. As noted above, task-switch 
conditions have eight unique cue-cue transition types, while cue-switch 
and no-switch only have four each. Mayr (2006) took advantage of this 
fact by manipulating the frequency of half of the task-switch transitions 
types (labeled task-switch-2) in a between-participant manner, while 
leaving the probability of the other half of task-switch transitions types 
(labeled task-switch-1), cue-switch and no-switch transitions types 
identical within each group. The high frequency group was presented 
task-switch-2 transitions 40% of the time and task-switch-1 transitions 
20% of the time, while the low frequency group was presented with task­
switch-2 10% and task-switch-1 transitions 30% of the time. Note this 
also results in a higher conditional probability of a task change given a 
cue change in the high probability group (p=.75) compared to the low 
probability group (p=.57). Cue-switch and task-switch effects were 
examined across the two groups. Task-switch-1 only trials were use.d to 
measure costs as cue-cue transition frequencies should not affect the 
results as these transitions type frequencies were identical to cue-switch 
and no-switch frequencies in each group. As predicted, participants 
were affected by overall switching probability, as task-switch effects were 
smaller and cue-switch effects were larger in the high task-switch-2 
probability group. Recall that adapting a strategy of preparing for a 
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switch would have the effect of reducing task-switch times (when one 
was "correct" that a switch would occur), but increase cue-switch times 
(when one was "incorrect" about a task switch and reconfiguration of the 
current task was then required). Furthermore, the cue-priming model 
would predict that task-switch transition types with a higher frequency 
in each group (i.e. task-switch-l for the low probability group and task­
switch-2 for the high probability group) would be primed and thus 
produce faster times and less errors than the lower probability types for 
each group. However this was not the case, as frequency effects 
(difference scores) were found to be either very small or actually reversed 
and unreliable in all cases. The results from Mayr (2006) thus provide 
evidence in favor of the task-level adaptation account over the cue­
priming model of probability effects in the cuing paradigm. More 
generally, these results also provide support for the dissociation of cue­
switching from task-switching components and are consistent with an 
explanation of switch-costs reflecting reconfiguration processes. 
Additional empirical and modeling work has examined the 
independence between cue-encoding and task-related processing by 
requiring participants to make two responses after the typical no-switch, 
cue-switch and task-switch transition types in the 4:2 cues-to-task 
paradigm. Altmann (2006), for example, had participants respond to 
cues in pairs of trials, with the cue only appearing at the beginning of the 
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pair. This allowed for examination of cue-switch and task-switch 
effects on the second trial in a pair that should, the author argues, be 
independent of critical cue-encoding processing (according to the cue­
priming model) since the cue is no longer present at this point. Robust 
task-switch effects, but no cue-switch effects, were seen on Trial 2 
conditions, suggesting that additional processing occurs during task­
switching that can not simply be accounted for by changes in the cue 
(Altmann, 2006). Moreover, Altmann (2006) attempts to fit both a cue­
.priming model and behavioral performance in the standard 1: 1 cues-to­
task cuing paradigm to the 4:2 cuing paradigm without tremendous 
success. 
Arrington, Logan and Schneider (2007) also attempted to separate 
cue-encoding from target processing to examine whether true task­
switching effects occur independently of cues. They required 
participants to make a response not only to the target, as in typical task 
cuing paradigms, but also to the cue itself before the target appeared. 
Arrington et al. (2007) make the assumption then that the two 
components occur serially and in fact find evidence consistent with 
successful separation of cue-switch and task-switch processing as cue­
switch effects were limited to cue-encoding RTs, at least when the cue­
response required making a decision about which task was cued. In 
these successful separation conditions, task-switch effects were seen in 
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target RTs, which argues against the cue-priming model as these 
effects could not be due to cue-encoding given the successful isolation of 
cue-encoding processes to the cue-response period. Arrington et al. 
(2007) admit that this is counter to the Schneider and Logan (2005) cue­
priming model and suggest that true task-switching effects do exist. 
Thus far, we have reviewed evidence that supports the idea that 
switch costs, at least as measured in the cuing paradigm, do not solely 
reflect task-set changes-in fact, a simple change in the cue indicating 
the next task, with or without a corresponding change in task, has been 
shown to be a large determinant of switch costs. However, current 
explanations of this cue-switch effect, along with the labile task-switch 
effect, posit differing mechanisms. One view advances the concept of a 
two-component system, with one stage involved in the retrieval of task 
rules and the other in the application of these rules given stimulus 
presentation. The opposing view puts forth a single priming model that 
determines the correct response in switching via the compound cue-to­
response and target-to-response associations strength. Thus, the degree 
of association between cues on successive trials will determine the 
amount of priming of the relevant retrieval pathway required for a 
response. Further, these cue-switch and task-switch effects are 
modulated by the arbitrariness of the cues used, as well as the 
probability of switching. Both models, thus far, have been able to 
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account for these effects. However, the single-priming accounts seem 
to be making amendments that allow for the existence of at least some 
task-switch specific processes, tipping the scales in favor of two­
components models. Nevertheless, a consensus has by no means been 
reached. Brain imaging during performance of a 4:2 cues-to-task cuing 
paradigm may then held elucidate the degree of separableness of these 
two components. 
Neuroimaging Studies of Task-Switching 
Before describing our experimental method in detail, we first 
review studies that have examined task-switching, or task-switching like 
(i.e. S-R reversal tasks), performance during functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning. We will be paying special attention to 
a number of variables and results from these studies that are 
particularly relevant to our study (Experiment 1); these include the inter­
trial interval (ITI) used between trials, whether the experiment was 
attempting to separate components of switching (e.g. isolating the 
preparatory component of switching, or an attempt to separate cue from 
task switching), the types of cues used (number, arbitrary/semantic) and 
the behavioral switch cost obtained during scanning. 
Early fMRI studies of task-switching generally found areas of 
activation consistent with notions of the cortical areas critical to 
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"cognitive control." For instance, prefrontal cortex areas thought to be
involved in working memory and executive functions such as dorsolateral
and ventrolateral PFC (DLPFC and VLPFC, respectively) have reliably
been observed when contrasting switch versus repeat trials (e.g. Dove,
Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon 2000; Kimberg, Aguirre, &
D'Esposito, 2000; Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & Carter, 2000;
Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Brass & von Cramon, 2002; 2004;
Barber & Carter, 2005; Badre & Wagner, 2006; Ruge, Brass, Koch,
Rubin, Meiran, & von Cramon, 2005), although see Yeung, Nystrom,
Aronson and Cohen (2006) for evidence that lateral PFC activity might be
limited to task-specific processing and not to some general switching
mechanism. Other prefrontal regions have shown activity in several
switching studies that also tested conflict resolution and/ or monitoring,
such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Yeung et al., 2006; Dreher &
Berman, 2002; Barber & Carter, 2005; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004)
and frontopolar regions thought to be responsible for hierarchical control
(e.g. Pollmann, Weidner, Muller, von Cramon, 2000; Koechlin et al.,
2003). Additional frontal regions, albeit in the more posteriorly located
premotor cortex, supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas
(SMA and preSMA, respectively), areas implemented in motor planning
and preparation, have been reported (Dove et al., 2000; Brass & von
Cramon, 2004; Ruge et al., 2005; Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von
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Cramon, 2005; Badre & Wagner, 2006). Prefrontal regions tended to 
lateralize to the left hemisphere, although activity was certainly not 
limited to the left hemisphere and some of the left dominant activity 
could be accounted for the prevalence of verbal type stimuli used in 
these studies. In addition to frontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, 
including bilateral precuneus and intraparietal suclus (IPS) areas have 
consistently been activated in switching studies (Dove et aI., 2000; 
Kimberg et aI., 2000; Brass & von Cramon, 2004; Barber & Carter, 2005; 
Slagter,Weissman, Giesbrecht, Kenemans, Mangun, Kok, et aI., 2006; 
Forstmann et aI., 2005; Ruge et aI., 2005; Badre & Wagner, 2006; 
Gruber, Karch, Schlueter, Falkai, & Goschke, 2006). 
While this broad fronto-parietal network of activity gives us an 
overview of areas involved in task-switching, several studies have 
attempted to further clarify the neural properties of switching. Namely, 
most of these attempts have focused on trying to separate the theorized 
"preparation" stage from the target induced "execution" stage. The most 
common of approach to this has been simply to isolate the preparatory 
period, although some researchers have also attempted to examine both 
components within single experiments. Unfortunately, the findings 
reported regarding preparation in task-switching are far from conclusive. 
Many of the initial studies attempting to isolate preparatory neural 
components during switching were unable to detect reliable areas of 
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activation specific to switch trials during preparation (e.g. Brass & von 
Cramon, 2002; Braver et al., 2003; Dove et al., 2000; Luks, Simpson, 
Feiwell, & Miller, 2002; Ruge, Brass, Koch, Rubin, Meiran, von Cramon, 
2005). In other words, contrasting long preparation times (i.e. long CSIs) 
with short preparation times yielded no interaction with the transition 
(switch) type. Some authors have argued that such a result is 
incompatible with the idea that preparation allows for reconfiguration of 
the system, specifically the overcoming of persistent interference from the 
now irrelevant task set (e.g. Ruge et al., 2005). They argue that if 
resolution of interference is assumed, this lack of activity is counter to 
intuition because on switch trials activity should be greater during long 
CSIs due to the greater requirement of control processes needed to 
reduce interference. However, this intuition seems to assume any such 
control processes are not also generated on short CSI trials. 
Interestingly, recruitment of the "common" control areas seen in 
task-switching, such as lateral prefrontal, premotor and posterior 
parietal cortices, have consistently shown heightened activity for general 
preparation (i.e. for both switch and repeat trials) in task-switching 
paradigms (Dove et aI, 2000; Sohn et al., 2000; Brass and von Cramon, 
2002; Gruber et al., 2006). This pattern of results has generally been 
interpreted as evidence against the notion of switch specific endogenous 
control processes in task-switching situations, despite clear behavioral 
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evidence that preparation reduces switch costs (e.g. Rogers and 
Monsell, 1995). It should be noted though these claims do not rule out 
the occurrence of any control processes during switching, rather these 
mechanisms might be common to both switch and repeat transition 
trials. 
Additionally, researchers have attempted to isolate this general 
preparatory activity strictly to cue-related processing (Luks et al., 2002; 
Brass and von Cramon, 2002; Ruge et al., 2005; Barber and Carter, 
2005; Gruber et al., 2006 and Slagter et al., 2006), rather than diluted 
effects of cue plus target processing. However, only the studies by 
Barber and Carter (2005), which found activity only in a left SPL region, 
and Slagter et al. (2006), in lateral prefrontal and parietal regions, found 
activity elicited specifically to cue-driven, preparatory processing for 
switch greater than repeat trials. These two studies are further detailed 
below. 
While the current study is not focused on preparatory effects of 
switching per se, and is not designed in a manner to isolate these 
processes, we are interested in breaking switching into separable 
components. We next summarize several particularly relevant studies 
that have attempted to delineate components of switching. However, the 
time limitations of the fMRI methodology, namely the sluggish response 
of the BOLD signal, present an interesting problem for trying to separate 
46 
preparation from stimulus processing with the typical behavioral 
approach of comparing short versus long CSIs. Although early studies 
did just this (e.g. Sohn et al., 2000; MacDonald, 2000), they required 
very long cue-to-stimulus intervals, on the order of several seconds, to 
reliably separate cue from target BOLD responses. However, behavioral 
studies of preparation during switching have used CSIs on the order of 
milliseconds and in fact less than a second or so has shown to be 
optimal for preparation (e.g. Rogers and Monsell, 1995). This lengthy 
time delay between the cue and stimulus may well have elicited 
extraneous or otherwise spurious processing from that seen in 
behavioral examinations of preparation. 
As such, Brass and von Cramon (2002) devised an ingenious 
method for isolating preparation effects independent of CSI time. The 
authors employed a cuing paradigm that included the standard cue­
interval-target condition, as well as a novel condition in which only a 
cue, and no target, was presented. With this unique cue-only condition, 
the authors argued they were able to examine preparation related neural 
responses unadulterated from any target related neural response. Brass 
and von Cramon (2002) found a fronto-parietal network, very similar to 
areas consistently seen in switching studies, for preparation. These 
areas included a bilateral VLPFC region, near the junction of the 
precentral and inferior frontal sulci (termed the inferior frontal junction, 
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or IFJ), a more anterior region in MFG, premotor and pre-SMA areas in 
addition to bilateral IPS and posterior parietal regions. Two of these 
regions, the IFJ and the pre-SMA, showed strong correlation with 
behavioral indices of the cuing effect (as measured in this paradigm, cue 
and target together trials minus trials in which the cue was presented 
before a target). Moreover, by examining cue-target simultaneous trials 
with cue-only trials, the authors claimed they were able to separate these 
preparation related areas from target only areas. Brass and von Cramon 
(2002) make the claim that the strongest areas from this contrast 
occurred mostly in premotor and motor cortices, along with the ACC; 
although this dissociation does not seem to have been completely non­
overlapping as posterior parietal areas and the IFG region also showed a 
heighten response for this contrast. The most critical finding from this 
study for our purposes, however, is the fact that this preparation activity 
was common for both for both repeat and switch conditions, consistent 
with the Dove et al. (2000) finding. However, while a behavioral main 
effect of cuing was present, this did not interact with switching. This 
differs from the standard interaction observed between preparation and 
switch costs, namely a reduction of switch costs with longer CSIs, at 
least when cuing is assessed in this manner. This lack of a behavioral 
interaction between preparation and switching may account for the lack 
of switch specific preparation activity in Brass and von Cramon (2002 
48 
In a following study, Brass and von Cramon (2004) also 
attempted to separate cue-switching from task-switching by employing 
their so-called "double cue" design with a 4:2 mapping between cues and 
tasks. As suggested by the name, within each trial, participants would 
receive an initial cue, followed by a 700 ms interval, then a second cue 
(which could be the same cue, a different cue but indicating the same 
task or a different cue indicating the other task) followed by a variable 
(60 or 700 ms) CTI and finally the target stimulus. These three different 
second cue types, cue repetition, cue-switch and meaning switch thus 
correspond to the no-switch, cue-switch and task-switch definitions of 
Mayr and Kliegl (2003). Stimuli consisted of digits and the tasks were to 
determine either the magnitude or the parity of the presented number. 
Additionally, Brass and von Cramon (2004) used single-cue "catch trials" 
on a proportion of trials, that consisted only of a the first cue and target, 
but otherwise were like other trial types, in order to "ensure" that 
participants made use of the first cue in a set. Behavioral results 
revealed somewhat small, but reliable effects for cue-switching, -70 ms, 
and task-switching, ~ 60 ms, at the short CTI. For the imaging analyses,' 
they chose to combine across the CTIs, as their previous study (Brass 
and von Cramon, 2002) failed to find a switch by CTI interaction. No 
cue-switch related activity was found in prefrontal cortex, although with 
a lower threshold they did observe premotor, inferior temporal gyrus and 
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fusiform gyrus areas. Analysis of their task-switch contrast revealed a 
strong area of activity in an area they earlier termed the inferior frontal 
junction (IFJ), named because of it's proximity to both the precentral and 
inferior frontal sulci (Brass & von Cramon, 2002) in the left hemisphere. 
Additionally, right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and right IPS showed task­
switch related activity. 
In a combined neuroimaging and computational study, Badre and 
Wagner (2006) attempted to delineate task reconfiguration and 
interference models of task-switching. Using an explicit cuing paradigm 
with letter /number stimuli and a variable CSI, Badre and Wagner (2006) 
found a network of cortical areas similar to those previously reported in 
lateral PFC (including several distinct regions within in VLPFC), SMA and 
inferior and superior parietal cortices. A simple connectionist model of 
task-switching was also constructed and model estimates were compared 
to regions found from the neuroimaging portion of their study. Their 
computation model, entitled CAM-TS (control of associative memory 
during task-switching), contained three simple hierarchical levels: a task 
level, conceptual (the two concepts within each task, e.g. "odd" and 
"even") and a response level. Learning within this model occurred via the 
strengthening of connections between layers that were mutually 
activated across trials. Theoretically, this is similar to the Logan (e.g. 
Logan, 2002) conceptualization of learning as discrete "event-files". The 
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negative result of such a learning system is the presence of conflict 
resulting from the activation of the irrelevant task via associative priming 
of shared "set" components or features, such as a response key. A 
critical aspect of their model is a control-like component that biases 
processing from the task to the concept layers during preparation 
intervals before task-switches. Results from this model differentiated 
conflict arising from conceptual level, which was reduced with 
preparation, from response level interference, which tended to increase 
with preparation (time/cycles). Critically, Badre and Wagner (2006) 
showed that these interference effects seen in the model parallel results 
observed from two regions in the fMRI results. Specifically, a region in 
what they termed mid-VLPFC showed a decrease in signal change with 
increasing preparation time (longer CSls), which closely follows the 
decrease in activation levels of the conceptual layer of the model with 
increasing cycles. However, a region in inferior parietal lobe follows the 
opposite pattern. Activity (percent signal change) in this region actually 
increased with longer CSls; the response level layer from the model 
follows a similar increase with increasing cycles. The author relate this 
activity in mid-VLPFC to studies of LTM retrieval (semantic and episodic) 
which have shown similar regions of activity and claim this neural region 
is involved in essentially the same computations in both task-switching 
and LTM retrieval situations-the resolution of proactive interference. 
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The posterior parietal area, they argue, based on previous literature
and the trend suggesting a role in response conflict, may be involved in
the lower-level processing of conflicting response options.
Slagter et al. (2006) also attempted to disentangle reconfiguration
from purely cue-related processing explanations of preparatory effects on
switching. By examining the neural response to conditions in which only
the cue was presented, the authors argue they were able to isolate
processes involved solely in preparation since no target stimulus
processing would contaminate the neural response observed in these
cases. Tasks involved determining the orientation of either a centrally
presented rectangle, based on its color, or based on its spatial location
given a unique cue (e.g. "attend left") presented 1500 ms before target
onset. Trial conditions thus consisted of cue-repeat, switch-within
dimension (e.g. attend left to attend right) and switch-across dimensions
(e.g. attend left to attend center). It should be noted that such a
paradigm is probably more accurately deemed a cued "attention-shifting"
paradigm, rather than the "standard" cued task-switching method largely
considered thus far. While previous studies have examined cue-only
neural responses, and thus presumably preparatory processing, most of
these failed to find regions uniquely involved in switching tasks during
preparation (e.g. Luks et al., 2002; Brass and Von Cramon, 2002).
Slagter et al. (2006) hoped to differentiate from these studies by also
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examining so-called "global" aspects of switching, such as the number
of features, dimensions and task sets participants were required to
switch between. As such, they manipulated the trial types present in a
given block such that "repeat blocks" consisted only of cue-repeat trials,
"single-switch" blocks containing only cue-repeat and switch-within trials
and "mixed blocks" contained all three trial types.
Regions in bilateral motor planning areas (SMA and premotor),
bilateral posterior parietal areas (IPS and precuneus) as well as one
region in the right fusiform gyrus showed switch related (switch-within
greater than cue-repeat) activity to cues presented alone. Further, this
difference between switch-within and repeat trials was modulated by
block type, as it was smaller in the mixed compared to single-dimension
blocks. Moreover, Slagter et al. (2006) showed this effect resulted from
an increase in repeat trials across repeat-only, single-dimension and
mixed-dimension block types. The authors interpreted this effect as
consistent with the claim that changes in "global task" aspects can affect
performance in switching situations (as demonstrated by Mayr & Kliegl,
2003). Slagter et al. (2006) offer a number of possible explanations of
mechanistic changes in processing that these global differences might
elicit. One such explanation is akin to claims that participants adopt a
change in strategy when presented with a high percentage of switch trials
(Mayr, 2006; Monsell and Mizon, 2006). Overall switch rates in the
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mixed-block of Slagter et aI. (2006) were 75% (50% switch-across and 
25% switch-within trials). Recall this strategy hypothesis claims that 
when confronted with such a high rate of task alternation, participants 
may simply abandon the just-completed task-set and prepare for a 
switch in tasks on a majority of trials. While this should be 
advantageous when an actual switch in tasks occurs, in the case of a 
task-repeat trial, participants now have to reengage (i.e. reconfigure) this 
abandoned task set, leading to an inflation of processing resources to 
repeat trials in these situations. The increase in signal activity on repeat 
trials across block types seen by Slagter et aI. (2006) is highly consistent 
with this claim as block types increased in not only their "complexity" 
but also on the percentage of switch trials present in each one (from 0% 
to 50% to 75% in repeat to single to mixed block types, respectively). 
Further, they made the claim that the high number of task sets required 
to switch between in previous studies may account for the previous 
failures to find switch specific preparatory effects (e.g. Brass and von 
Cramon, 2002, Luks et aI, 2002; Shulman et aI, 2002, Ruge et aI., 
2005). 
In yet another studying attempting to isolate components of 
switching using fMRI, Barber and Carter (2005) attempted not only to 
separate cue-related from target-related neural processing during task­
switching, but also to delineate switch-specific processing from another 
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control process-resolving conflict from prepotent versus non­
preponent stimuli. They used a stimulus-response compatibility task, in 
which participants make responses to simple stimuli (the letters "I" or "r", 
standing for "left" and "right", respectively) with either compatible left and 
right responses on a keyboard, or with incompatible (i.e. "non-prepotent") 
responses (e.g. right keyboard response to the "I" stimulus) based on a 
cue presented 7.5 seconds before stimulus presentation. The authors 
found mostly non-overlapping areas for the preparation period: bilateral 
DLPFC, anterior cingulate and a left anterior frontal areas during 
preparation for an upcoming non-prepotent, compared to prepotent, 
stimulus, but only one region involved in preparing for a task-switch, in 
the medial precuneus (SPL). However, a region in left lateral precuneus 
(-25 77 43) was activated during the response phase in both the 
prepotency and switch conditions. Non-overlapping areas during the 
stimulus phase included medial prefrontal and bilateral premotor areas 
for prepotency and a right VLPFC and a left inferior parietal 10bule (IPL) 
for switching. 
In summary, neuroimaging studies of task-switching have 
consistently activated a left franto-parietal network. While early studies 
did not always find switch specific activity, subsequent studies have 
isolated regions showing greater activity on switch compared to repetition 
trials. These switch specific regions tend to occur in the same left 
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dominated network, particularly, in left ventrolateral PFC, lateral 
premotor and superior parietal regions. Somewhat less consistently, but 
still oft observed, activations have also been reported in medial frontal 
regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and ventromedial PFC. 
Early attempts at isolating preparatory components of switching were 
also met with mixed results, as some studies did not find regions 
showing a greater response on switch versus repeat trials during 
preparatory intervals. Even among the early studies that found switch 
specific preparation activity, this activity did not always include frontal 
regions. These results have thus been used to argue against the idea 
that control processes are required during switching. However, the 
failure to find either switch specific or switch specific preparatory activity 
may have been due to task design (namely very long CSls) and/ or fMRI 
methodology limitations. Several recent studies employing advanced, 
rapid event-related fMRI designs have in fact successfully isolated 
components of task-switching, including PFC regions during preparation. 
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CHAPTER III
 
DISSOCIATING CUE-SWITCHING FROM TASK-SWITCHING USING
 
NEUROIMAGING
 
At this point, we have presented two equally viable models that 
account for the observed effects in the explicit task-cuing procedure: 
reconfiguration or retrieval (e.g. Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Monsell and Mizon, 
2006) and cue priming or interference accounts (e.g. Logan & Bundesen, 
2003; 2004; Schneider & Logan, 2005; 2006, Arrington & Logan, 2004). 
Given the implications these disparate results imply for models of task­
switching, we attempted to clarify this discrepancy. Specifically, we 
implemented a fMRI study using the basic 4:2 cue-to-task mapping 
paradigm originated by Mayr and Kliegl (2003). The two-stage, memory 
based account of Mayr and Kliegl (2003) and the alternative, "control 
less" account proposed by Logan and Bundesen (2003) make unique 
predictions for the patterns of neural activation expected when 
comparing cue-switch versus task-switch effects. A simple prediction of 
the two-stage account, for example, is that we should observe separable 
networks of activation for the task-switch effect compared to the cue­
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switch effect. Moreover, if the "retrieval" stage truly reflects LTM 
retrieval of task rules, one would predict neural areas of activation 
broadly consistent with those found in previous neuroimaging studies of 
LTM retrieval, such as medial temporal lobes and prefrontal cortex 
(predominantly left PFC). Similarly, we would predict the "application" 
stage to activate primarily superior parietal areas in reflection of the 
attentional changes needed to implement the given task rule once a 
stimulus is present. 
Conversely, the Logen and Bundesen (2003) account would predict 
very little activation for the task-switch contrast, given the interpretation 
that no real "task-switching" occurs. This account would also predict a 
very similar activation pattern between the cue-switch contrast and the 
neural areas of activation seen in previous research, given they propose 
that cues are critical in disambiguating the retrieval path to the correct 
set of response options and their observed behavioral pattern of large 
effects for cue-switching, but non-significant task-switch effects (Logan & 
Bundensen, 2003). Moreover, given the priming model of switching 
posits a single mechanism, such an account would predict a high degree 
of overlap between anatomical regions involved in cue-switching and 
task-switching. The Logan and Bundensen (2003) model might predict 
similar regions of activity for cue and task-switching, but that cue-switch 
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and no-switch conditions would show lower activity in these regions,
reflecting episodic and semantic priming.
We were interested not only in examining neural networks involved
in cue versus task-switching, but also to see if we would observe the
areas broadly consistent with those seen in previous fMRI studies of task
switching given our rapid, event-related
design with a more "realistic" pace between stimuli and that produced
switch costs on par with behavioral studies. Many of the earlier studies
on task-switching have used extremely long inter-trial intervals on the
order of tens of seconds and may compromise or dilute the kind of task
switching effects seen in behavioral studies.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Participants were 20 right-handed, native English speakers with
normal or corrected to normal vision. The mean age of participants was
24 years old (range of 19-28 years old). Informed consent was obtained
in a manner approved by the University of Oregon Institutional Review
Board. Participants were compensated monetarily for taking part in the
study.
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Presentation 
The current study employed a random-cuing task-switching design 
(e.g. Meiran, 1996). This task-switching design required participants to 
respond to two choice reaction time tasks, responding either to the color 
(red, green or blue) or the shape (circle, square or triangle) of a stimulus. 
Stimuli consisted of the nine different permutations of the color/shape 
combinations possible (e.g. a green triangle). 
The visual display on each trial consisted of a centrally located 
white box against a black background with the colored shapes appearing 
in the center of the box. Each task was preceded by a single letter cue 
presented above the box which indicated which of the two tasks was to 
be performed on the current trial. A 4: 2 mapping between letter cues 
and tasks was used, such that two different letter cues were used to cue 
each task (Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; Logan and Bundeson, 2003). The 
letters 'J' and 'X' indicated the color task, while the letters 'B' or 'W' 
indicated the shape task. See Figure 1. 
This allows for the analysis of three main trial types, as discussed 
above and in Mayr and Kliegl (2003), no-switch, cue-switch and task-. 
switch. A no-switch trial thus is defined as a trial in which the same 
letter cue is repeated. A cue-switch trials indicates a different cue than 
the previous trial was presented, but which indicates the same task to be 
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performed on the current trial. A task-switch trial then is one in which
both the cue and task change from the previous trial.
Figure 1. Task Design for Experiment 1. Three-choice color
discrimination (red, green, blue) and shape discrimination (circle,
square, triangle) tasks were used and responses were made with three
buttons on a hand-held button box. A 4:2 cues to task design was
used, such that each task was cued by two separate letters. The color
tasks was cued by the letters 'J' and 'X' while the shape task was cued
by the letters 'B' or 'W.' The cue-to-stimulus (CSI) and response-to-cue
(RCI) intervals were held constant at 100 and 1500 milliseconds,
respectively. Examples of each of the three switch-type conditions of
interests (no-switch, cue-switch and task-switch) are shown as
illustrated in the trial n + 1 panel, as determined by the respective cue
and task type from the preceding trial n panel.
No Switch
ClUle Switch
Task Switch
CSI
100 ms
trial n
RCI
1500 ms
trial n+1
Responses were made with a hand-held response box with the left,
middle or ring finger of the right hand. The left key was mapped to the
"red" or "circle" response, the middle key to the "green" or "square"
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response and the right key mapped to the "blue" or "triangle" response. 
This resulted then in a third of the stimuli presented as affording a 
congruent response (the correct response key would be correct for either 
task). 
Stimuli were presenting using Matlab and Psychophysics Toolbox 
software (Brainard, 1997) on an Apple Macintosh G4 computer. Stimuli 
were projected onto a screen at the head end of the bore of the scanner 
and viewed the screen via a mirror attached to the head coil. 
Unlike Mayr and Kliegl (2003), both types of cue-switch transition 
were allowed per task (i.e. both 'J' to 'X' and a 'X' to 'J'), however the 
sequence was generated such that there were equal probabilities of a no­
switch (NS), cue-switch (CS) and task-switch (TS) condition type 
throughout the experiment. The design also implemented a restriction of 
no more than three switch trials in a row and did not allow for response 
repetitions (i.e. a trial in which the correct response key was repeated 
from the previous trial). Response repetitions have been shown to have 
differing effects for no-switch compared to switch trials (e.g. Rogers and 
Monsell, 1995). Although examination of these response repetition 
effects can be informative (e.g. Mayr and Kliegl, 2003), in order to 
simplify the design and analysis, we choose to avoid this factor for the 
current experiment. 
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We employed a rapid event-related fMRI design with the following 
timing parameters. The letter cue onset was followed by a 100 ms cue­
to-stimulus interval (CSI). Time between subsequent trials (cues) was 
self-paced, such that it was determined by participants' variable 
response time on each trial, with a time-out maximum of 3,000 ms. This 
variation helps maximize reconstruction of the hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) for each condition and participant (Friston, Zarahn, 
Josephs, Henson, & Dale, 1999). However, to minimize potential 
"carryover" of the previous task-set, a consistent response-to-cue interval 
(RCI) of 1500 ms followed each response. To further introduce variability 
in the average inter-trial interval in hopes of better estimating HRF, 20% 
of trials were "null" events, such that no cue was presented and instead a 
white cross ('X') was presented for 3100 msec thf6i.lghthe displaybox~ 
These intervening null events allow for an attenuation of the combined 
HRF effects of closely spaced trials. Participants were instructed that no 
task or response was required on these trials but that they should try to 
maintain their "focus" throughout these trials in order to be prepared for 
the next trial. Trials following null trials and the first trial in a block 
were excluded from the analysis, as they are not definable as one of the 
three critical trial types (NS, CS, TS) given there is not a immediately 
preceding trial in these cases. 
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Each participant also partook in a pre-scanning, behavioral 
practice session in order to familiarize them with the cue-task 
associations, response mappings and the general procedure of the 
experiment. The pre-test session consisted of four blocks of single-task 
trials (two blocks per task) and six mixed-task blocks; all blocks 
consisted of 48 trials. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in eight separate runs; there were a total 
of 826 trials. Equal numbers of the three critical transition types were 
presented. Anatomical scans were taken halfway through the 
experiment (i.e. after run 4). 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Imaging data was collected on a 3.0 Tesla Siemens Allegra scanner 
(Siemens Magnetom Vision, Erlangen, Germany), with standard head­
coil, at the Lewis Center for NeuroImaging (LCNI), University of Oregon. 
Anatomical images were acquired using aMP-RAGE T1-weighted 
sequence of 167 slices (whole brain) with a thickness of 1 mm (0 gap). 
Functional data was collected in a whole brain, echo-planar imaging 
(EPI) sequence consisting of 32 axial slices (slice thickness = 4 mm, 0 
gap, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 80°, matrix size = 64 x 64, 
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FOV = 200 mm). Thus, each resultant voxel was 3.125 mm x 3.125 
mmx4 mm. 
Data analysis was performed using Brain Voyager software (Brain 
Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands). Images from each run were first 
subjected to slice-time and 3-D motion correction and then filtered at a 
high-pass frequency of 3 cycles per run and linear trends were removed. 
A 4 mm spatial Gaussian smoothing kernel (FWHM) was then applied to 
the images. Images were tranformed into Talairach space (Talairach, 
1988) and re-sampled into 3 mm isotropic voxels; functional images were 
then co-registered using one of the middle runs (fourth or fifth). 
Analysis Strategy 
Our main goal was to determine whether the two putatively 
independent processes of cue-switching and task-switching could be 
separated on a neural as well as behavioral level. We employed the 
following analytical strategy to address this, as well as additional 
questions. First, each whole-brain individual participant's data was 
combined and the group data was then submitted to a random-effects, 
General Linear Model multiple regression analysis. Crossing the task (2) 
by compatibility (2) by switch type (3) factors resulted in 12 unique 
predictors. These predictors were convolved to the standard basis set of 
hemodynamic response functions as used in the BrainVoyager software. 
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Three critical contrasts were then performed on the group data 
involving the switch-type factor: 1) the "overall switch" contrast, task­
switch versus no-switch trials (TS-NS), 2) the "cue-switch" contrast, cue­
switch versus no-switch trials (CS-NS) and 3) the "true task-switch" 
contrast, task-switch versus cue-switch trials (TS-CS). This contrast will 
also be referred to simply as the "task-switch" contrast, but it should be 
noted this is different than the standard switch contrast, TS-NS, used in 
most task-switching studies. The alpha level for all three contrasts was 
set to p < .002, uncorrected, with a clustering extent threshold of 40 
contiguous voxels (1,563 mm3). The first contrast is intended to create a 
broad overview of switch-related activity and allows for a comparison of 
areas found in our study for consistency with previously reported areas 
of general switch activity. The cue-switch contrast is intended to isolate 
areas involved in the hypothesized "retrieval" stage (reflecting LTM 
retrieval and/or rule selection or updating processes). The "true" task­
switch contrast is intended to isolate those regions respond uniquely to 
an actual change in task-set, which might reflect processes involved in 
switching between attentional dimensions, switching between response 
options, or resolving conflict on the response level. 
Next, regions of interest (ROI) will be determined based on the 
results of the cue-switch and task-switch contrasts from the whole-brain 
analysis. Regions selected will be any that show non-overlapping activity 
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between these two contrasts and that also lie within, or very near, 
regions also activated in the overall switch contrast. The rationale for 
this latter constraint that it is possible that a cluster might be activated 
in the overall analysis that does not reflect switching related processing. 
For example, an area might respond greater on cue-switch than no­
switch trials, but is not also activated more strongly for task-switch 
compared to no-switch trials and as such is probably not related to 
switching processes per se. 
Event-related averages will be constructed by taking the MR 
activity from these selected ROIs for the three critical switch-type 
conditions and averaged over each run, participant and voxel from the 
selected cluster, from six seconds before to 16 seconds after stimulus 
(cue) onset. Visual inspection and statistical tests of these event-related 
averages will serve as confirmatory evidence that the switch-type 
conditions can be separated in these areas and give us a better 
indication of the exact neural response of each of these conditions within 
these regions. Statistical t-tests were conducted on the average percent 
signal change from a time window of 5-7 seconds (one seconds before 
and after the average hemodynamic peak) after cue onset comparing cue­
switch with no-switch activity (i.e. CS contrast) and comparing task­
switch with cue-switch activity (i.e. TS contrast). Correlations between 
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this average MR percent signal change in these areas for these two 
contrasts and behavioral data was also analyzed. 
Behavioral Results 
Average reaction times (RT) and percent error scores served as the 
dependent variables of interest for the behavioral anlaysis. The task 
transition (switch) type was defined post-hoc based on the preceding 
trial: no-switch trials repeated both the cue and task type, cue-switch 
trials repeated the task, but not the cue and "true" task-switch trials, 
repeated neither the cue nor the task. We first analyzed both the RT and 
error data with three-way ANOVAs, testing transition type (no-switch, 
cue-switch, task-switch) by task (color, shape) by congruency 
(incongruent, congruent). Figure 2 shows the average reaction time (RT) 
and percent error scores for the three transition types. As expected, we 
found no-switch trials were the fastest (M = 996 ms, SO = 203 ms), cue­
switch trials were intermediate (M = 1153 ms, SO = 232) and task-switch 
trials the slowest (M = 1241 ms, SO = 241 ms). The accuracy data 
followed the same general pattern with the fewest errors seen in no­
switch trials (M = 3.73 %, SO = 4.61 %), cue-switch trials intermediate (M 
= 5.16 %, SO = 5.24 %) and task-switch trials incurred the most errors 
on average (M = 5.48 %, SO = 5.88 %). The main effect of transition type 
proved highly reliable, both in the RT data, F(2, 38) = 79.24, 12 < .001 and 
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Figure 2. Behavioral Results from Experiment 1. Results shown as a 
function of transition type. Mean Reaction Times (RTs) are seen in 
the top panel, mean percent error scores in the bottom panel. Error 
bars represent standard error scores within each condition. 
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in the error data, F(2,38) = 4.70, Q < .05. Also as expected, the overall 
congruency effect, incongruent minus congruent trials, was highly 
reliable in both the RT data (mean difference = 69 ms, 3D = 44 ms; 
F(1,19) = 49.17, Q < .001) and the accuracy data (mean difference = 
4.33%, 3D = 3.51%; F(1,19) = 30.44, Q < .001). The color and shape 
tasks appeared to be similarly difficult as average response times for 
color trials (M = 1116 ms, 3D = 231 ms) were highly similar to shape 
trials (M = 1124 ms, 3D = 219); F(1,19) = .10, Q >.10; although color 
trials elicited slightly less errors (M = 4.44%, 3D = 5.00 %) than shape 
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trials (M = 5.13 %, SD = 5.59 %), this was not a significant difference, 
F(1,19) = 1.90,2. >.10. Congruency effects interacted with task type, as 
the congruency effect for shape trials were larger (M = 109 ms, SD = 73 
ms; M = 5.38 %, SD = 4.45 %) than the congruency effect for color trials 
(M = 29 ms, SD = 57; 3.28 %, SD = 3.87 %) in the RT and error data: 
F(1,19) = 13.84,2. < .01 and F(1,9) = 4.35 2. = .05, respectively. 
Interestingly, the congruency by switch effect was seen in the error data, 
F(2,38) = 5.46, 2. < .01), but not in the RT data, F(2,38) = .36,2. > .10. 
In order to examine the effects of interest of transition type, we 
followed the procedure of Mayr and Kliegl and performed two non­
orthogonal contrasts on the data: 1) the cue-switch contrast comparing 
cue-switch to no-switch trials and 2) the "true" task-switch effect, 
comparing task-switch trials to cue-switch trials. A large cue-switch 
effect was seen in RTs (M = 157 ms, SD = 84 ms) and errors (M = 1.44 %, 
SD = 2.25 %), confirmed by the main effect of transition type in the cue­
switch contrast for RTs, F( 1,19) = 72.18, 2. < .001 and errors, F(l, 19) = 
8.13,2.< .05. A highly reliable congruency effect was again seen (across 
no-switch and cue-switch trials): F(1,19) = 30.14, 2. < .001 and F(1,19) = 
19.33, 2. < .001, for the RT and accuracy data, respectively. However, the 
congruency effect was not modulated by the cue-switch contrast in either 
the RT data, F(1,19) = .97,2. > .10 or the accuracy data, F(1,19) = .66,2. 
> .10. 
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A smaller, but highly reliable, task-switch effect was also seen in 
the RT data, M =: 88 ms, SD =: 69 ms F(1,19) =: 32.09,2 <.001. However, 
the accuracy data failed to show a reliable task-switch effect, F( 1,19) =: 
.19,2> .10. Main effects of congruency were again seen when limited to 
the task-switch effect, F(1,19) =: 38.25,2 < .001 and F(1,19) =: 23.46, 2 < 
.001, for RT and accuracy data, respectively. The predicted switch by 
congruency interaction did prove reliable for the task-switch contrast in 
the accuracy data, F(1,19) =: 9.37, 2 <.01, but not in the RT data, F(1,19) 
=: .22,2> .10. 
Neuroimaging Results: Whole Brain Contrasts 
Overall Switch 
The overall-switch contrast is intended to create a broad overview 
of switch-related activity. This contrast serves then to compare areas 
found in our study for consistency with previously reported areas 
generally involved in switching. Whole-brain analysis was performed 
comparing task-switch predictors against the no-switch predictors. In 
general, as seen in previous stUdies, large areas of primarily left superior 
parietal lobe (SPL; precuneus, BA 7) and prefrontal cortex (BA 9 & SA 46) 
were highly activate. Other regions of strong activity were seen in left 
hemisphere motor-related areas (SA 4 & BA 6) (FEF), visual areas in 
bilateral fusiform gyrus, posterior cingulate (BA 31) and sub-cortical 
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regions in the midbrain (substantia nigra) and cerebellum. For a 
complete list of regions, see Table 1. Figure 3 offers a visual display of 
the frontal and parietal regions activated in the overall switch contrast 
and Figure 4 shows some of the inferior and cerebellar regions (overall­
switch regions shown in tan). 
The SPL area of activation encompassed a massive region of voxels 
including left lateral SPL, a large medial portion and extended somewhat 
into right SPL. The lateral extent of this region included large swaths of 
intra-parietal suclus (IPS) as well. The large left frontal region of activity 
was observed mostly on the Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) in prefrontal 
cortex, although it also included significant portions within premotor and 
motor cortices anterior on the precentral gyrus. 
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Table 1. Regions of Activation for the Overall-Switch Contrast. 
Overall-Switch Contrast == task-switch versus no-switch conditions. 
MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus. SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus. Ant. == 
Anterior. Pos == Posterior. BA = Brodmann Area. 
Talairach
 
Label Area of Peak Activation BA Extent (mnr) x y z
 
Parietal Lobe Regions 
A. L/M/R Superior Parietal Lobule (SPL) 7 645,703 -19 -65 41 
B. M SPL Precuneus 31 11,172 0 -68 22 
Frontal Lobe Regions 
C. L MFG - Lateral PFC 9/46 122,813 -45 17 30 
D. L MFG - pos. Premotor 6 28,164 -27 -8 61 
E. L MFG - ant. Premotor 6 17,930 -27 11 55 
F. L MFG - inf/lat Premotor 6 4,453 -44 48 
G. M SFG - medial Premotor 6 2,539 -2 6 51 
H. L Motor - Precentral Gyrus 4 2,266 -45 -7 45 
I. L Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) 9 1,680 -43 -3 24 
Inferior Regions 
J. L Fusiform Gyrus 37 8,281 -50 -55 -16 
K. L Fusiform Gyrus 37 3,242 -38 -56 -13 
L. M Occipital Lobe (Lingual Gyrus) 19 2,852 2 -58 0 
Sub-Cortical Regions 
M. Midbrain - Substantia Nigra 9,336 -12 -19 -5 
N. L Cerebellum - Pos. Lobe (Declive) 18,477 -40 -66 -19 
O. R Cerebellum - Pos. Lobe (Declive) 16,641 36 -68 -22 
P. M Cerebellum - Ant. Lobe (Nodule) 7,461 -50 -30 
Q. R Cerebellum - Pos. Lobe (Uvula) 2,695 28 -78 -24 
R. R Cerebellum - Pos. Lobe (Tonsil) 1,836 40 -59 -31 
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JFJlgU.llr<e 3. 3D Rendering of Brain Activations from
Experiment 1. Portions of the activations from the Overall
Switch (TS-NS; shown in tan), Cue Switch (CS-NS; shown
in green) and the Task Switch contrast (TS-CS; shown in
blue) are plotted in 3D space. Regions represent group
data from the whole-brain analyses projected on a surface
rendering of Talairach space from one participant, with a
transparent view of the left hemisphere. Labels
correspond to Cue Switch and Task Switch clusters
identified in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. L = Left, R
= Ri ht. Ant. = Anterior, Pas. = Posterior.
Cue-Switch Contrast
We then turned our attention to separating cue changes from task
changes. The cue-switch contrast, again, compared cue-switch (CS)
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predictors to no-switch (NS) predictors. Table 2 lists the regions, 
including the Talairach coordinates from the center of peak activation, 
significantly activated above our threshold for the cue-switch contrast. 
Cue-switch regions are identified by label, starting with the letter "C" (for 
cue-switch contrast) in Table 2. The major left frontal and parietal 
regions are also seen in Figure 3 (in green). 
The largest region of activity was again found in left superior 
parietal lobule (precuneus, BA 7; C1) with a extent of 130,391 mm3 , 
although this region was more left lateralized than in the overall switch 
contrast. A separate, much smaller region was seen more medially in left 
SPL (C3) as well as small region in right SPL (C2). Two left frontal, motor 
related regions were observed, one appearing in motor cortex proper (BA 
4; C5) and one more anterior region presumably in premotor cortext (BA 
6; C6). Two large left prefrontal regions along MFG were also activated: a 
more anterior and ventral region in BA 46 (C8), hereafter also labeled 
VLPFC, and a more posterior and slightly dorsal region in BA 9 (C7), 
hereafter also referred to as Inferior Frontal Junction (IKJ), after Brass 
and von Cramon (2002). Two regions were found along the cingulate 
gyrus, one, smaller region, along the anterior cingulate (BA 24; C9) and 
another in posterior cingulate cortext (BA 31; C4). Further analysis of 
these regions indicated they were uniquely involved in cue-switch related 
processing (i.e. cue-switch activity was greater than no-switch activity, 
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but task-switch activity was not greater than no-switch activity). One 
other small anterior region, was activated near the left insula (BA 13; 
C 10). The only inferior regions showing significant activation was seen in 
the right anterior lobe of the cerebellum, near the culmen (Cll). 
Additionally, several regions showed "deactivations" such that no­
switch activity was greater than cue-switch activity in these clusters. 
Two of these regions were along the dorsal extent of anterior cingulate 
cortex (BA 24; -C12 and -C13), one in right middle frontal gyrus (BA8, ­
C14) and one in medial frontal gyrus (BA 9; -C15). Examination of 
event-related averages revealed a similar pattern in all of these regions: 
decreases in all three switch conditions below baseline, followed by the 
quicker rise of no-switch conditions, in relation to cue-switch and task­
switch conditions, back to and above baseline. All regions showed a 
significant effect of no-switch greater than cue-switch trials, but none 
showed a significant difference between cue-switch and task-switch 
trials. 
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Table 2. Regions of Activation for the Cue-Switch Contrast. Cue­

Switch Contrast = Cue-switch versus No-switch conditions. BA =
 
Brodmann Area. Labels indicate the position of the region (if visible)
 
in Figure 2. Labels preceded with a "-" sign indicate those areas that
 
showed greater no-switch than cue-switch activity Areas in italics
 
indicate areas that underwent further investigation in Region of
 
Interest analyses; event-related averages for these regions are shown
 
in Figure 3.
 
Talairach 
Label Area of Peak Activation BA Extent (mm) x y z 
Posterior Regions 
Cl L Superior Parietal Lobe (Precuneus) 7 130,391 -33 -59 43 
C2 R Superior Parietal Lobe (Precuneus) 7 2,188 8 -71 41 
C3 L Superior Parietal Lobe (Precuneus) 7 1,758 -11 -65 45 
C4 R cingulate 31 , 3,438 25 -46 22 
Anterior Regions 
C5 L Motor 4 4,297 -36 -16 60 
C6 L Premotor 6 2,422 -49 45 
C7 L Middle Frontal Gyrus (IFJ) 9 8,398 -41 12 30 
C8 L Middle Frontal Gyrus (VLPFC) 45/46 4,727 -40 27 22 
C9 R cingulate 24 2,539 14 0 39 
Cl0 L Insula 13 2,031 -27 -, 0 24 
Inferior Regions 
Cll R Cerebellum - Ant. Lobe (Culmen) 1,797 , 7 -45 -, 5 
Deactivations (ns > cs) 
-C12 dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 24 7,695 -7 30 -2 
-C13 dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 24 6,094 -2 31 8 
-C14 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 2,656 , 5 38 41 
-C15 L Medial Frontal Gyrus 9 2,227 -3 45 15 
77 
Task-Switch Contrast 
As with the behavioral data, we also looked for regions that 
responded more during task-switch compared to cue-switch trials, i.e. 
regions showing a "true" task-switch effect. Table 3 lists regions found 
above threshold for this contrast and the two largest regions can be seen 
in Figure 3 (in blue). These two regions were again seen in superior 
parietal lobule, however with one occurring medially (TI) and more or 
less non-overlapping with the large left lateral region seen in the cue-
Table 3. Regions of Activation for the Task-Switch Contrast. Task-Switch 
Contrast = task-switch versus cue-switch conditions. BA = Brodmann Area. 
Label indicates the position of the region (if visible) in Figure 2. Areas in italics 
indicate areas that underwent further investigation in a Region of Interest 
analysis; event-related averages for these regions are shown in Figure 4. 
Talairach 
Label Area of Peak Activation BA Extent (mrrr) x y z 
Parietal Lobe Regions 
T1 /v1 Superior Parietal Lobe (Precuneus) 7 43,516 -6 -70 44 
T2 L Lateral Superior Parietal (Precuneus) 19 9,375 -29 -72 37 
Inferior Regions 
13 R Fusiform Gyrus 18 2,617 19 -79 -16 
T4 M occipital (Cuneus) 18 1,914 -2 -92 20 
Sub-Cortical Regions 
T5 R Cerebellum - Ant. Lobe (Culmen) 4,297 40 -49 -22 
T6 L Cerebellum - Pos. Lobe (Tonsil) 2,305 -36 -47 -33 
T7 /v1 Cerebellum - Ant. Lobe (Nodule) 2,148 -1 -50 -29 
T8 L Cerebellum - Pos. Lobe (Tuber) 1,836 -35 -73 -27 
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switch contrast (Cl). The other superior parietal area found in the 
task-switch contrast (T2), occurs more laterally, just posterior to the 
large SPLjIPS region (Cl) seen in the cue-switch contrast. 
In addition to the posterior parietal regions, two regions in occipital 
cortex showed significant activation levels: a region along the right 
fusiform gyrus and a medial region within the cuneus. Several sub­
cortical regions were also observed within the cerebellum. These 
included a left, medial and right region all approximately the same 
position along the superior-inferior (z axis) and anterior-posterior (y axis) 
planes (T6, T7 and T5 in Table 3, respectively). One additional cerebellar 
region was seen more caudally in the posterior lobe (Tuber) of the 
cerebellum. These regions, except for the medial occipital (T4) can be 
seen in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. 3D Rendering of Inferior and Posterior 
Regions of Activation for Experiment 1. Overall switch 
contrast (TS-NS) is shown in tan; Task-Switch contrast 
(TS-CS) is shown in blue. Group activations are 
projected on a 3D cortical surface rendering from one 
participant transformed into Talairach space 
(cerebellum not shown). Refer to Tables 1 and 3, 
respectively, for coordinates of the Overall-Switch and 
Task-Switch regions shown. 
Neuroimaging Results: Region ofInterest Analyses 
Cue-Switch Regions 
The whole brain contrast analysis gives us a good overview of the 
regions significantly activated during task-switching in general, as well 
as allow us to specify regions of interests from the cue-switch and task-
switch contrasts. However, as our primary goal remains to separate 
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putative cue-switching from task-switching processes, we need to take 
a deeper look at the activity patterns present in these regions. While the 
whole brain contrasts help us narrow down specific areas of interest, it 
does not necessarily inform us if these regions are truly involved in cue­
switching or true task-switching -at least in terms of how we have 
defined cue-switch related processing. That is, can we find areas that 
are activated strongly during both task-switch and cue-switch conditions 
compared to no-switch conditions? The cue-switch analysis, for 
example, will generate areas of activation that respond higher to cue­
switch than no-switch conditions, but the overall pattern could 
theoretically occur in a more graded response; in other words, task­
switch might also be greater than cue-switch conditions in these regions 
(TS > CS > NS). While this pattern would of course still be of interest, it 
would not necessarily fit our strict "retrieval" prediction of cue-switching. 
Cue-switch processing, as we have hypothesized, would produce regions 
that respond roughly equal to both cue-switch and task-switch 
conditions, since in either is a change in retrieval pathway, but with little 
to no no-switch activity. 
A constraint employed for determining a region for further ROI 
analysis was that it lay within, or very near, areas activated in the overall 
switch contrast. If two components of task-switching are truly separable, 
then we should be able to find cue-switch processing areas within the 
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areas activated by the overall switch contrast. The areas used from the 
cue-switch contrast are listed in italics in Table 2 and the event-related 
averages from these regions can be seen in Figure 5. The average 
percent signal change from the specified time window (5-7 seconds post 
cue-onset) from each of these regions was also subjected to the cue­
switch and task-switch contrasts and is reported for each of these 
regions below. 
We found responses of the following regions consistent with our 
predicted cue-switch response in several of the ROIs taken from the 
whole-brain cue-switch contrast. The large left superior parietal region 
(C 1), showed a large difference between CS and NS, t( 19) = 3.11, 12 = 
.006, but no difference between TS and CS, t(19) = .76,12 > .10. A similar 
pattern was seen in the two left precentral gyrus regions: motor cortex 
(C5) and premotor (C6) both showed strong CS greater than NS effects, 
t(19) = 3.09, 12 < .01 and t(19) = 2.81,12 < .05, but no difference between 
TS and CS, t(19) = .62,12 > .10 and t(19) = -.44,12 > .10, respectively. The 
left posterior VLPFC region, i.e. IFJ (C7), area also showed the predicted 
cue-switch response, with CS activity much larger than NS, t( 19) = 3.12, 
12 < .01 but TS statistically equal to CS activity, t(19) = .83, 12 > .10. The 
other left, more anterior, VLPFC region (C8) also showed a large CS 
versus NS effect, t( 19) = 4.11, 12 < .01, but a more graded response 
overall as the TS minus CS difference just missed significance, t( 19) = 
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2.09, .12 = .05. Although not shown in Figure 5, we also examined the 
event-related averages from the two smaller superior parietal regions. 
The more medial left SPL region (C3) actually showed neither a cue­
switch, t(19) = 1.78,.12 = .09 nor a task-switch effect, t(19) = 1.63,.12 = .12 
for the specified time window examined, while the right SPL region (C2) 
showed a more graded response, with both CS greater than NS, t(19) = 
2.12,.12 < .05 and TS greater than CS, t(19) = 2.90,.12 < .01, activity. 
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Figure 5. Event-Related Averages
from the Cue-Switch Contrast. Select
region of interest (ROI) analyses for
the Cue-Switch Contrast (cs-ns).
The average percent signal change
for each of the three switch-type
conditions from a 5-7 second time
window (from cue onset) is shown for
each region. No-switch is seen in
red, cue-switch in green and task-
switch in blue. Error bars represent
the 95% confidence interval for each
condition. Labels correspond with
those in Figure 3 and Table 2.
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Task-Switch Regions 
Event-related averages and corresponding correlational analyses 
with the behavioral task-switch effects (TS-NS) were also calculated. 
According to our predictions, areas showing "true" task-switching effects 
would be those that show a high activity for TS conditions and low 
activity for both CS and NS conditions, with no significant difference 
between CS and NS. Regions activated from the whole-brain task-switch 
contrast that also fell within areas activated by the overall task contrast 
can be seen in italics in Table 3. The event-related averages from these 
three regions can be seen in Figure 6. 
The largest of these regions was the medial SPL cluster (TIl, which 
showed the predicted "true" task-switch effect of a large difference 
between TS and CS, t(19) = 3.21, 12 < .01, but no significant difference 
between CS and NS, t(19) = 2.00, 12 > .05. Another medial posterior 
region, the medial occipital cuneus (T4) also showed the predicted 
pattern with TS much greater than CS, t( 19) = 3.01, 12 < .01 but no 
difference between CS and NS, t(19) = -.81,12 > .10. Of the several 
cerebellar regions activated from the whole brain task-switch contrast, 
only one fell within a region also activated from the overall switch 
contrast, an areas within the medial portion of the anterior lobe of the 
nodule of the cerebellum (T7); see Figure 3. This sub-cortical regions 
showed a strong TS greater than CS effect, t(19) = 3.21, 12 < .01, but no 
difference between CS and NS, t(19) = .057, Q > .10. The other left,
laterally located SPL region (T2), however, showed a graded response as
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the contrast between TS and CS was highly significant, t(19) = 3.40, Q <
.01 as was the CS versus NS contrast, t(19) = 2.40, Q < .05.
Figure 6. Event-Related Averages from the Task-Switch Contrast. Select
region of interest (ROI) analyses for the Task-Switch Contrast (ts-cs). The
average percent signal change for each of the three switch-type conditions
from a 5-7 second time window (from cue onset) is shown for each region.
No-switch is seen in red, cue-switch in green and task-switch in blue.
Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for each condition.
Labels correspond with those in Figure 3 and Table 3.
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Behavioral and Neurophysiological Correlations 
For all the ROIs areas, we also performed several correlational 
analyses of the MR percent signal change data from each region with 
behavioral measures of performance. While we first looked at potential 
correlations between behavioral cue-switch and task-switch effects (both 
RT and Percent Error scores) and MR cue-switch and task-switch 
differences, respectively, no significant correlations were seen in any of 
these regions. However, given that "true" task-switch areas were 
proposed to be involved specifically with an "application" stage given 
stimulus onset, we hypothesized that these areas might be particular 
sensitive to congruency effects. Congruency effects, recall, have been 
suggested to be tied directly to the residual component of task-switching, 
and might reflect interference from the automatic activation of the now 
irrelevant (i.e previous) task set. We performed correlational analyses 
then between the behavioral measures of the congruency effect (i.e. 
incongruent minus congruent conditions) for both RT and Percent Error 
scores with the MR percent signal change difference between TS and CS 
(task-switch effect) from the "true" task-switch regions of interest defined 
above. 
Moderate to strong correlations were seen in three of these regions, 
as can be seen in Figure 7. The medial SPL region (T 1) showed 
significant negative correlations between both the behavioral accuracy 
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and behavioral RT congruency effects with the task-switch minus cue­
switch (TS effect) percent signal change difference, Pearson's correlation 
coefficient r = -.619, Q = .003 and r = -.493, Q =.03, respectively. The 
medial occipital (cuneus, T4) showed a similar negative correlation 
between behavioral accuracy congruency effects and the MR task-switch 
effects, Pearson's r = -.603, Q = .005. Likewise, the medial nodule 
cerebellum region (T7) also showed a significant negative correlation 
between the behavioral percent error congruency effect and the TS-CS 
percent signal change from this region, Pearson's r = -.451,2 < .05. 
To ensure this was not simply a general phenomenon with 
congruency, we also looked for significant correlations in the cue-switch 
ROIs, between the MR CS-NS difference and the RT and accuracy 
congruency effects. No significant correlations were seen and Pearson's r 
coefficients were all below .30. 
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Discussion 
We attempted to achieve four main objectives with this experiment: 
1) replicate primary areas seen in previous studies of task-switching 2) 
find areas involved preferentially in "true" task-switching 3) determine 
whether areas involved in "true" task-switching overlap with areas 
involved in cue-switching and 4) determine the degree to which these 
results support the two-stage ("retrieval" and "application") theory of 
task-switching put forth by Mayr and Kliegl (2003). 
The first goal we attempted to answer with this study was the 
degree to which neural areas implicated in previous imaging experiments 
on task-switching would also be seen with the novel 4:2 cues to task 
mapping. Replication of the same basic brain networks seen in earlier 
studies of task-switching might, on one hand, seem a safe prediction. 
However, any possible number of differences could arise from the 
introduction of two cues per task that could significantly alter the 
observed brain response. For example, a greater working memory load 
might be required by participants to successfully maneuver in the more 
complex task structure our design presents. The results from the overall 
switch contrast (TS-NS) allow us to address how well we were able to 
replicate previously observed regions implicated in task-switching; again, 
this contrast is the "standard" measure of switching used and the most 
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appropriate then for answering this question. Our overall switch 
contrast did in fact yield results in line with many of the previous 
neuroimaging studies of switching: chiefly in left superior parietal lobe, 
left premotor and motor cortices and left prefrontal cortex. Successful 
replication of the neural loci involved in switching with the 4:2 cues-to­
task paradigm is critical for several reasons. For one, we have now 
established that the same general neural areas are involved in the 
standard cuing switching paradigm and the 4:2 cues-to-task version. 
These areas then are presumably involved in similar computational 
processes in both paradigms. 
Summarizing the results from the cue-switch contrast, we found 
activated regions primarily within the left fronto-parietal network 
observed in previous switching studies. The most prominent of these 
regions was a very large, robust region in left lateral SPL (Cl). Additional 
areas activating in cue-switching were a number of frontal regions, 
including motor (CS) and premotor (C6), probably lying within the frontal 
eye fields (FEFs), and two large lateral prefrontal regions (C7 & C8). All 
of these regions, except for the anterior VLPFC (C8) region, demonstrated 
the predicted pattern of large responses from cue-switch and task-switch 
trials, while little to no response in no-switch trials. This more or less 
equal response of cue-switch and task-switch trials (again, except 
arguably the anterior VLPFC region) suggests these cortical areas are 
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involved in similar processing requirements during both cue-switch
and task-switch trials. Computations that may be common with a
change in cue and a change in task likely include, but are not limited to:
retrieval of task rules (S-R associations) or goals from LTM, loading
and/ or maintaining these goals/rules in working memory, encoding and
interpretation of the cues and preparing appropriating motor plans based
on these S-R associations. Theoretically, this pattern of results is
consistent with a contribution of these regions to the conceptual first-
stage (retrieval/preparation) of task-switching. The finding of this left
frontal-parietal network as seen in previous studies in our cue-switch
contrast suggests previous studies of task-switching, which also
activated this network, were in fact activating this
"retrieval/reconfiguration" component of switching. Those studies that
did not find frontal areas specific to switching used long intervals
between the cue and target, thereby presumably allowing ample time for
preparation and thereby potentially nullify detection of any preparation
related neural components.
We also observed several smaller regions, primarily in anterior and
posterior cingulate gyrus, involved preferentially in cue-switching. That
is, cue-switch activity was larger than no-switch and task-switch activity.
While the cue-switch signal change in these areas was not particularly
large, it is an intriguing effect. These regions clearly do not fit the
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predicted "retrieval" component pattern of activity, since task-switch 
responses are not also elicited. While highly speculative, one possible 
explanation of this activity is that it represents a sort of "conflict 
response" due to a change in cue, but no change in task. In other words, 
these areas may be attempting to clarify the appropriate behavior 
(change or stay on the same task?) given a change in cue. This purposed 
function might be related to the purposed strategic changes hypothesized 
to occur in participants depending on the particular task parameters 
(like switching probability; e.g. Mayr, 2006). One way to test this idea 
then would be to observe whether fMRI activity in these regions is 
modulated by manipulations of switching probabilities. Additionally, if 
this activity represents a general "confusion" about the need to switch 
tasks or not given two cues per task, we might expect this activity to be 
greater during earlier portions versus later portions of the experiment, 
where task performance is more practiced. 
We have also yet to address the number of "deactivation" (ns 
greater than cs) regions seen in the cue-switch contrast. Again, these 
regions, located in medial frontal regions, anterior cingulate cortex and 
medial PFC, showed sustained no-switch responses compared to cue­
switch and task-switch. More specifically, the no-switch responses 
tended to drop below baseline along with cue and task-switch conditions 
early in their response function, but then showed a more rapid rise than 
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the other conditions. One straightforward interpretation of this
pattern, especially given the ACC and medial PFC loci of these regions, is
that these regions monitor for task or rule repetitions and when detected,
they cause a "reactivation" of the just used· task rule, allowing for quick
responses in the case of a task repetition. While these regions are likely
not involved in the actual implementation of these rules, they may be
responsible for signaling other task-specific regions that repeat of rule is
allowed.
As predicted, we were able to find several regions involved
preferentially in "true" task-switching. Most notably, medial and
posterior regions in superior parietal (Tl) and occipital (T4) cortices, as
well as medial cerebellum (T7) were seen. Examination of the event-
related averages within these areas revealed large responses to task-
switch conditions, with little to no response from cue-switch or no-switch
conditions. Finding such regions that respond solely to task-switching
supports the notion that changing tasks requires unique processing that
is not necessary when simply changing cues; this in turn also supports
the idea of the existence of independent components comprising
switching. Further, the medial parietal, medial occipital and cerebellar
location of these regions is consistent with the putative "application"
stage of switching. Although we have thus far remained mostly agnostic
as to the type of computational processing this so-called applications
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stage of processing entails, we shall address this in more detail below. 
For now, it is important to note the establishment of unique, and more or 
less non-overlapping areas, for true task-switching. Although the 
number of regions found in the task-switch contrast were few, there is no 
a priori reason to believe that large or numerous areas of cortex need be 
involved in "true" task-switching, especially as theorized by Mayr and 
Kliegl (2003) as primarily responsible for application of task-rules to 
given stimuli. Although the other large left, lateral superior parietal 
region (T2) also showed a strong response to the task-switch contrast, 
deeper examination leaves us hesitant to also classify this as a "true" 
task-switching area, or an area preferentially involved in the "application" 
stage of switching. While the task-switch response was clearly the 
strongest from this region, the ROJ analysis of this region revealed a 
more graded response with a robust response seen not only between 
task-switch and cue-switch trials, but also between cue-switch and no­
switch trials. 
Additional evidence that supports the idea these medial and 
posterior areas might be involved in stimulus specific processing, comes 
from the correlational results between behavioral congruency effects and 
task-switch contrast imaging effects from these regions. All three of 
these areas showed negative correlations between the congruency and 
task-switch variables, that is, greater MR signal change difference 
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between TS and CS tended to result in smaller behavioral congruency 
effects in these participants. This suggests that these regions might be 
specifically involved in reducing conflict in incongruent conditions, 
presumably a process that can only be accomplished once the stimulus 
is present (i.e. without preparation). As aforementioned, congruency 
effects in switching situations may emergence from the relatively 
automatic activation of irrelevant stimulus-response associations. This 
is consistent then with the idea that these task-switch regions might be 
involved in low-level, stimulus or response based processing. These 
observed correlations with congruency were unique to these two "true" 
task-switching regions (medial SPL and nodule of the cerebellum) and 
not in any of the cue-switching regions, evidence consistent with the role 
of these areas in the "application" stage of switching. 
Not only were we able to detect brain regions responsive to both 
cue-switching and task-switching, these regions activated by these two 
contrasts were found to be more or less non-overlapping. Cue-switching 
activated a primarily left frontal-left lateral SPL network, while the task­
switch contrast produced mostly medial, posterior areas. In fact, an 
additional whole-brain conjunction analysis between the cue-switch and 
task-switch contrasts was performed to explore the question of neural 
overlap between these two theoretically distinct computational processes 
(i.e. CS-NS and TS-CS) and revealed only one region that survived the 
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threshold - but not in parietal cortex or even the cerebellum, but in the 
left thalamus (Talairach coordinates: -21, 3, -2; extent = 4,297 mm3). 
However, one might still argue that the two largest regions from 
the cue-switch and task-switch contrast both occur in proximal SPL 
regions, C1 and T1, respectively. Given the proximity of these regions, 
one could argue, even if non-overlapping, these regions may be involved 
in similar computational demands and should not be considered 
independent of each other. Additionally, the second largest task-switch 
region (T2) is also seen in left lateral SPL and essentially abuts part of 
the large left lateral cue-switch (C 1) area. While there is some merit to 
this argument, the results from the ROJ analyses of these regions 
provides a strong argument for a functional independence of these areas 
(at least Tl compared to Cl). Again, C1 shows a strong response for 
both cue-switch and task-switch conditions while T1shows a sole 
response for task-switch trials. Moreover, T l's strong correlation with 
behavioral congruency effects, while C 1 lacks such a correlation, further 
suggest a functional difference between the two regions. However, the 
more lateral T2 region, which shows a pattern somewhere in between 
these two and physically sits between the two regions, may act as an 
intermediary between the two areas. It could be involved functionally in 
both preparation/ retrieval and application components of switching, or it 
could be a communication conduit between parietal cue-switch and task­
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switch locations. In summary, the physical difference between cue­
switch and task-switch regions, including a total lack of frontal areas 
involved in task-switching, combined with an apparent functional 
difference, provides evidence for independent components of task­
switching. Again, this is not to say there are not some areas that may be 
involved in both processes (or sub-processes) or communicate between 
regions involved solely in one or the other component, but the evidence 
presented strongly argues against a completely overlapping system. 
Contributions ofThese Regions to Switching 
Before we address the final goal of the study, assessing the two­
stage model of task-switching, we speculate on what computational 
processes might be occurring within each of the major regions found in 
our study during switching. This speculation is based primarily on 
previous neuroimaging studies that activated similar regions with 
relevant tasks. For example, the left lateral prefrontal regions (VLPFC), 
"C7" and "C8" observed in the cue-switch contrast are consistent with 
previous task-switching studies showing greater left VLPFC activity on 
switch versus no-switch trials (e.g. Dove et aI, 2000; Dreher and Berman, 
2002; Badre & Wagner, 2006). However, what computations might 
lateral PFC regions contribute, specifically, to task-switching 
performance? 
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Outside of the task-switching literature, lateral PFC regions have 
oft been implicated as critical to the maintenance and manipulation of 
information in working memory (Smith & Jonides, 1999; Curtis & 
D'Esposito, 2003). Manipulation of information within working memory 
might include processes such as: updating and or selecting the contents 
of WM, inhibition of previously relevant material in WM or sequencing 
different chunks in WM. We cannot make strong claims about whether 
or not any of these sUb-processes of working memory manipulation are 
necessarily occurring in our task-switching paradigm. However, it 
follows theoretically that manipulation of material in working memory is 
a likely candidate for the type of computation occurring in lateral PFC 
during switching (or during cue-switch and task-switch trials in our 
case). This is a critical point, that this proposed manipulation of 
material within WM is unique to switch trials (in our case, a cue- or task­
switch). This is opposed to any general WM processes, for example mere 
maintenance of information, which might occur during all trials types­
as evidenced by the lack of a response for NS trials from these lateral 
PFC regions in our data. This result differs from some of the previous 
studies on task-switching which do not find switch specific frontal areas. 
Although, as previously mentioned, this failure to find frontal areas 
involved specifically in switching may be due to extended preparation 
times in these studies. Sufficient preparation time would allow 
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participants to update necessary information (task-rules/ goals/ S-R 
associations) in working memory and presumably the frontal regions 
reflecting this process would not be seen in contrasts between switch 
and no-switch with long preparation intervals. 
Further, a breadth of regions in left prefrontal regions have oft 
been attributed to other mnemonic functions, in particular, retrieval of 
task relevant information from LTM. As previously discussed, LTM 
retrieval has been argued to be a major determinant of switch costs (e.g. 
Mayr and Kliegl, 2000) and cue-switch costs have been argued to reflect 
this process (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). Similar left VLPFC regions have been 
previously implicated in LTM retrieval studies (e.g. Ranganath, Johnson, 
D'Esposito, 1999). Left VLPFC seems particularly involved in the 
retrieval of semantic associations (Gabrieli, Poldrack, & Desmond, 1998; 
Fiez, 1997; Poldrack, Wagner, Prull, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1999). 
More specifically, activity in left VLPFC regions has been show to be 
related to overcoming interference from competing representations in 
LTM retrieval tasks (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 
2005; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005), which may be restricted specifically to 
mid-VLPFC (Badre & Wagner, 2006), analogous to our more anterior 
VLPFC region ("C8"). 
The more posterior of our left PFC regions, ("C7"), lies within a 
region that has been activated in a number of previous task-switching 
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studies and has been dubbed inferior frontal junction "IFJ", due to its 
anatomical location near the intersection of the precentral sulcus and 
the inferior frontal sulcus (Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004; Derrfuss, 
Brass, Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005). In the Brass and von Cramon 
studies (2002; 2004), this area was activated during the preparation of 
task rules and was correlated with behavioral cuing scores (Brass and 
von Cramon, 2002). Further, the IFJ showed up as a common cluster of 
activation in a meta-analysis of task-switching, set-shifting (such as in 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task; "WCST"), Stroop task and S-R reversal 
tasks (Derrfuss et al., 2005). Additionally, Brass and von Cramon (2004) 
argued that activation in this area is not related simply to encoding the 
cue. These combined results point to a critical role of the IJF in the 
updating of task representations (Brass and von Cramon, 2002; 2004, 
Derrfuss et al., 2005). This is also highly consistent with the argument 
made for a very similar left VLPFC region's role as retrieving and 
maintaining abstract rules (Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, &Wagner, 2003; 
Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006). 
All of these possibilities-working memory updating, rule 
representation, conflict resolution and LTM retrieval-fit our theorized 
notion of the cue-switch component's role during task selection. While 
we can not definitively exclude any of these possibilities, the results from 
the Badre and Wagner (2006) study shed some additional light on the 
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source of switch costs and the utility of these lateral frontal regions
during task-switching. Namely, their "mid-VLPFC" region, an area that
uniquely showed a reduction in activity with increased CSI that mirrored
activity from the "concept" layer of their model, lies in a corresponding
location to the more anterior of our two left lateral PFC regions ("CS").
They also showed a large region of activity in an IFJ-like region, although
activity here was not modulated by CSI. They argue then that left mid-
VLPFC region exerts control in the context of task-switching by
overcoming conflict from competing task-sets, consistent with perceived
notions of left inferior PFC role in resolving proactive interference (see
Jonides & Nee, 2006 for a review of PI in WM tasks).
The role of the large left lateral SPLjIPS area (C 1) is less clear, but
several possibilities exist. Intraparietal sulcus is commonly activated in
studies investigating attention, both of the spatial and non-spatial variety
(Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999; Kanwisher, & Wojciulik, 2000). Lateral
superior parietal areas have also been implicated in stimulus-response
(S-R) associations. Such activity has been suggested to involve the
actual mapping of a stimulus onto a response (i.e., "response selection");
for example, Jiang and Kanwisher (2003) found the bilateral IPS (as well
as frontal eye fields) to be a common site of response selection, across
several paradigms and modalities. Although the exact locus of this
parietal region may differ slightly depending on whether the task material
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is spatial or non-spatial, such posterior parietal regions are a common 
area activated in response selection manipulations (Schumacher, Elston, 
& D'Esposito;2003; Bunge,Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen,&6-abrieli; 2002). 
Regarding the "true" task-switch areas, the cerebellar activity may 
at first glance appear a bit puzzling. The function of the cerebellum in 
motor coordination is well known (Ito, 1984). More recent work, 
however, suggests cerebellar processing may not be limited strictly to 
motor control. The cerebellum has been implicated on a wide range of 
tasks, including, but not limited to: non-motor related associative 
learning (Drepper, Timmann, Kolb and Diener (1999), attention switching 
(Courchesne, et al., 1994; Wager, Jonides, Smith, & Nichols, 2005), 
conflict resolution (Schweizer, Oriet, Merian, Alexander, Cusimano, & 
Stuss, 2007) or other "executive" like processing, given its preferential 
connections with prefrontal cortex (Middelton and Strick, 2001). This 
putative role in attentional shifting is highly consistent with activation 
from our task-switch contrast, which presumably require shifts attention 
from one perceptual dimension and cerebellar activity has been linked 
specifically to switching between visual features in a study by Le, Pardo 
and Hu (1998). 
However, as Bischoff-Grethe, Ivry and Grafton (2002) point out, 
such studies often confound the actual shift of attention with changes in 
S-R mappings. Using a procedure intended to disentangle attention 
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shifting from these changes in S-R mapping, termed "response 
reassignment" by the authors, they in fact found bilateral cerebellum 
activity unique to the responsereassignment conditions, but not to 
conditions solely involving shifting attention (Bischoff-Grethe et al., 
2002). The Schweizer et al. (2007) study provides additional evidence 
that control functions of the cerebellum may be tied specifically to 
stimulus-response associations, possibly particularly in resolving conflict 
between competing S-R associations. They found that patients with 
localized cerebellar lesions demonstrated larger congruency effects 
compared to controls. Switching further modulated this effect, as 
congruency effects were larger for switch compared to repeat trials in the 
patient group, but not in the control group (Schweizer et al., 2007).5 
Moreover, this did not appear to be a general deficit in task difficulty in 
the patient group as no group differences were seen in overall switch 
costs. Given this result in conjunction with our correlational data 
relating the brain activity from the task-switch contrast to behavioral 
congruency effects, it seems likely that the cerebellum plays a significant 
function in resolving conflict between task sets and S-R associations. 
Interpretation of the large medial SPL (TI) area's role in "true" 
task-switching parallels the interpretation of cerebellar activity. Medial 
posterior parietal regions have been implicated in both studies of 
5 However this was true only in the error data as this contrast did not 
reach significance in the RT data. 
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attention shifting and response switching. For example, a highly 
homologous cluster to our observed "T1" area was seen in medial 
precuneus, extending into left IPS, during shifts of attention from one 
visual feature to another (Liu, Slotnick, Serences, & Yantis, 2003). 
Similar, albeit slightly superior and inferior, medial precuneus regions 
have also been implicated in shifts of spatial and object-based attention 
compared to maintenance of attentional focus, suggesting that medial 
SPL areas may be involved in general shifts of attention, independent of 
the exact type of attention employed (Serences, Liu, & Yantis, 2005). 
Consistent with this idea, Wager et al. (2005) looked for common areas of 
activation between "object" switching and "attribute" shifting within the 
context of a task-switching like paradigm. They argue that most studies 
of task-switching confound the switching of the locus of attention from 
one visual dimension to another (what they call "object" switching) with 
switching the operation to be performed, in other words changing the 
task rule (what they call "attribute" switching). One common areas of 
switching activity found in their study was within medial parietal lobe; 
additionally, this area was more strongly activated by "object" versus 
"attribute" switches (Wager et al., 2005). 
However, as previously discussed, there lies the possibility that 
attention switching activity, as tested experimentally, may also reflect 
switching of motor responses. A fMRI study by Rushworth, Paus and 
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Sipila (2001) supports this idea that attention shifting and response 
shifting occur in dissociable areas within posterior parietal cortex. 
Clusters of activity occurred slightly more anteriorly and laterally in IPS 
for visual attention shifts compared to more medial and posterior areas 
involved in response switches. However, it should also be noted this was 
a between-subjects comparison and differences could have arisen solely 
on anatomical variability or normalization differences between 
participants. Also consistent with this idea of medial SPL function in 
response mappings, or reversal of previous S-R mappings, a meta­
analysis of imaging studies involved in interference resolution found a 
peak cluster highly similar in location to our "Tl" area (Nee, Wager, & 
Jonides, 2007). 
Regarding the more posterior parietal cluster activated in the task­
switch contrast (T2), it is difficult to make strong claims, based on 
previous literature, that processing in this parietal region is qualitatively 
different that the IPS region (el) observed in the cue-switching contrast. 
However, it is possible that anterior and posterior regions of IPS 
contribute distinct processes during switching. Posterior IPS may be 
particularly critical for switching between perceptual dimensions, 
consistent with putative processing in the "application" stage of task­
switching, which can only occur once the stimulus is presented. Le, 
Pardo and Hu (1998) found a region of posterior SPL, very similar to our 
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observed posterior SPL (T2) area, when contrasting attention shifting
from sustained attention.
Assessment ofthe TuJo-Campanent Madel afTask-Switching
In summary, it should be noted that these regions, particularly
posterior parietal and lateral prefrontal cortical areas have been activated
in a multitude of neuroimaging studies. As such, a full assessment of
the numerous cognitive, motor and affective tasks that have elicited
activity in our ROls is well beyond the scope of this discussion. However,
our intention was to illustrate a number of relevant results that coincide
with the likely contributions of these areas to task-switching. Further,
this investigation of possible processing demands of each of these regions
allow a qualitative assessment of the "model" of task-switching put forth
by Mayr and Kliegl (2003). Namely, as aforementioned, they propose a
two-component conceptualization of switching consisting of a "retrieval"
stage and an "application" stage, with each mapping more or less onto
the cue-switch and task-switch contrast, respectively.
Again, this first stage, thought to be reflected in the cue-switch
contrast, potentially involves LTM retrieval, updating of task rules within
working memory and overcoming interference from previous task-sets.
The imaging results from the cue-switch contrast mesh well with Mayr
and Kliegl's (2003) speculation, as the strongest and largest areas
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responding to this contrast were in left lateral PFC and left lateral
superior parietal lobe, areas repeatedly observed in memory studies.
Lateral PFC, particularly VLPFC, as observed in our study, have also oft
been implicated in LTM retrieval studies as well as overcoming proactive
interference-both consistent with reconfiguration. It is difficult to
speculate much beyond this, although the results from the Badre and
Wagner (2006) study suggest that mid-VLPFC might be uniquely involved
in control processes needed to overcome interference. The more
posterior PFC region (IFJ) likely is involved in the other major proposed
process during reconfiguration of updating the currently relevant task
goal or task rules. Retrieval and updating of task rules may occur even
on no-switch trials and may explain why this region is sometimes also
activated during preparation intervals for repeat trials. Presumably
though, updating is a necessary process on switch trials, whereas on
repeat trials it is only occasional recruited, in instances where the
current task-set is lost (e.g. due to distraction). The lateral IPSjSPL
activity seen in the cue-switch contrast is also consistent with working
memory functions, but SPL activity is also sometimes observed in LTM
retrieval tasks (Fletcher, Shallice, & Dolan, 1998).
The application stage, in contrast to the reconfiguration stage,
was thought to involve those processes that can only be, as the name
implies, "applied" once a target stimulus is perceptually presented (Mayr
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& Kliegl, 2003). Again this conceptualization is highly consistent with
the results from the task-switch contrast, as regions associated with
non-spatial shifts of attention between visual features and/or between
response options were observed. Given our bilvalent stimuli, presumably
shifting attention from the formerly relevant to the currently relevant
dimension (e.g. color to shape) is a necessary step for task-switch, but
not cue-switch, trials. This might be particularly true of the posterior
IPS region seen in the task-switch contrast. A related process
presumably required for task-switch, but not cue-switch, trials is the
resolving of interference present when a response is required to the
current stimulus that is different (i.e. incongruent) than the response to
this stimulus in a previous context (i.e. task-set). The process of
decoupling a no longer relevant stimulus-response association and/ or
the activation of the currently relevant stimulus-response association is
likely reflected in our medial posterior and cerebellar regions from the
task-switch contrast. These areas presumably work to resolve these
incongruencies, as larger differences in the percent signal change
between task-switch and cue-switch resulted in lower behavioral
congruency effects on average, as evidenced by the negative correlations
reported in these medial regions. In summary then, our results provide
strong support for the proposed retrieval and applications stages of task-
switching.
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While we favor an interpretation of the present results that 
supports the two-component account of cue-switching versus task­
switching, it is by no means an indisputable conclusion. For example, 
while our cue-switch and task-switch contrasts are mostly non­
overlapping, there are a number of areas in which these "separable" 
components are in close proximity. Namely, left lateral superior parietal 
area includes both cue-switch and task-switch swaths of activity. While 
even the fairly liberal threshold used in our analysis results in largely 
non-overlapping cue-switch and task-switch areas, lowering this 
threshold further obviously results in much larger regions of overlap. 
Moreover, there are a few regions showing graded responses between 
task-switch, cue-switch and no-switch (i.e. ts greater than cs, cs greater 
than ns). Specifically, the lateral posterior parietal area seen in the task­
switch contrast (T2) shows such a pattern, as does the anterior VLPFC 
region (C8) seen in the cue-switch contrast. Although this. VLPFC region 
does not show a statistical difference between task-switch and cue­
switch, visual inspection of the responses here clearly follow a graded 
response. 
These facets of the results, the graded responses and higher 
overlap with lower thresholds, could be argued as being incompatible 
with a two-component account. In fact, instead of characterizing this 
graded response pattern as showing task-switch greater than cue-switch, 
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it may be more accurate to refer to the pattern as reduced cue-switch
compared to task-switch activity. Such a characterization is thus more
consistent with the associative priming model (e.g. Schneider and Logan,
2005).
However, before conceding to a singular priming account of our
data, note that only two of all the ROls we analyzed showed clear graded
responses. Further, the whole-brain analyses, with the above caveats,
still reveal a more or less non-overlapping cue-switch and task-switch
pattern. Additionally, alternative interpretations to the priming account
of these graded responses, particularly the VLPFC region, are possible.
One such possibility we liken to the potential strategic computations that
occur during switching, as postulated by Mayr (2006) and Monsell and
Mizon (2006). Recall that Mayr (2006) presented evidence suggesting
task-switches are particularly sensitive to the conditional probability of
switching given a cue change. Relating this to our observed anterior
VLPFC region, activity here may initially begin to ramp up with
presentation of a new cue, in anticipation of a task-change, but relax
once cue encoding processes, that indicate a change in task is not
required, have completed. Further, an interpretation of this region as
reflecting purely priming processes is inconsistent with Badre and
Wagner's (2006) interpretation of activity in a highly similar region as
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reflecting control processes that resolve interference, based on their
computational and neuroimaging results
Conclusion
Thus far we have addressed and provided support for the goals of
this study as previously outlined. Namely, our observed left fronto-
parietal network of activation is consistent with activity found during
switching in neuroimaging studies using more "conventional" task-
switching paradigms. This overlap provides construct validity that the
4:2 cues-to-tasks method is in fact assessing the same switching
processes, in so far as this can be reflected by common neural regions of
activity, as other task-switching paradigms. Additionally, consistent with
behavioral differences between task-switches and cue-switches, we found
regions (mostly medial posterior and cerebellar) that responded
preferentially to "true" task-switching. This result supports the idea that
task-switching, at least in the context of cuing designs, does not simply
reduce to cue-switching; this in turn supports the idea that task-sets are
a critical determinant of selection. Moreover, regions involved in true
task-switching were delineated from regions involved in cue-switching.
Qualitative examination of the likely type of cognitive processing
occurring in each of these regions lends support for two-component
models of task-switching (e.g. the "reconfiguration" and "application"
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stages proposed by Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). A recent event-related 
potential study by Jost, Mayr, and RosIer (2008) also closely parallels our 
results, as it also provides evidence of a neurophysiological dissociation 
between cue-switching and task-switching. Specifically, Jost et al. 
(2008) observed an early, cue-switch difference appearing relatively early 
(following cue onset) in anterior sites, while a later, task-switch difference 
was seen in more posterior sites. However, our results can not 
conclusively rule out priming accounts, or at least contributions from 
priming like mechanisms, or switching. However, the results are 
consistent with the idea that retrieval between task-sets is a necessary 
processing step during switching, an idea further considered in Chapter 
v. 
113 
CHAPTER IV
 
TASK SELECTION COST ASYMMETRY WITHOUT TASK-SWITCHING:
 
EVIDENCE FOR ASSOCIATIVE RETRIEVAL MECHANISMS IN TASK­

SWITCHING
 
Recall from Chapter I a particularly intriguing result from the task­
switching literature, the so-called "switch cost asymmetry" effect. Again, 
this phenomenon, first described by Allport, Styles and Hsieh (1994), 
occurs when participants switch back and forth between two tasks 
differing in relative dominance, such as Stroop word naming versus color 
naming. In such situations, switching from the less dominant to the 
more dominant task takes longer than vice versa. In other words, it 
seems more difficult to establish an easy task than to establish a difficult 
task. The paradoxical nature of this effect makes it an important 
challenge for models of executive control. 
So far, the dominant account of the switch cost asymmetry is in 
terms of trial-to-trial carryover of relative levels of activation for the 
dominant versus the non-dominant task within a connectionist type 
model (e.g., Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). We refer 
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interact is not fully known. It may make sense to think of these two
purported components as reflecting two heads of the same beast. Namely
the more or less controlled retrieval of task rules from long-term memory
and the automatic retrieval of task configurations, while each has
separable influences on switching, they are both in essence mnemonic
functions. It is known that memory cues can induce either automatic or
intentional retrieval, for example. Future exploration of whether the two-
components posed here map discretely onto the controlled versus
automatic distinction is of high interest. One way to potentially examine
this would be to employ a process dissociation procedure (e.g. Jacoby,
1991) with the 4:2 cues-to-task cuing procedure. Divided attention tasks
have been used before (Jacoby et al., 1993) as a method of manipulating
control aspects, as presumably a controlled process would interact with
a shared stage of processing in a divided attention task, but automatic
mechanisms should be relatively unharmed by such a manipulation.
Another avenue for addressing this controlled versus automatic question
might be manipulations involving the amount of training of each of these
components. One would assume that training would affect the controlled
cue-switch component, as strengthening of cue-task pathways should
benefit from practice. Conversely, given the presumed automatic nature
of the task-switch component, training would be expected to have less of
an effect on the task-switch component. Training effects on the



















